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WHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT MISBEHAVES 
 




This Article addresses one of the lingering questions following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management District. In that land use case, the Court held that proposed 
local government monetary exactions from property owners to permit 
land development were subject to the same heightened scrutiny test as 
imposed physical exactions. The Court left unanswered the question of 
how broadly this heightened scrutiny should be applied to other monetary 
obligations imposed by the government. The Article argues that “in-lieu” 
exactions that are individually assessed as part of the permitting process 
should be treated differently than the impact fees that are developed 
through the legislative process and are applied equally to all developers 
without regard to a specific project. Accordingly, Koontz’s application 
should be limited to “the special context of land-use exactions” during a 
permitting process rather than be extended to all regulatory monetary 
obligations.  
The Article begins by identifying the various levels of scrutiny 
applied to land use decisions and shows how these levels are designed to 
prevent the abuse of power, particularly when actions are exercised at 
the individualized level. It concludes by suggesting that exactions that 
result in a permanent physical occupation of real property should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny. However, only administrative, 
individualized, monetary exactions, designed to replace a physical 
exaction, such as the kind involved in Koontz, should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny to control the potential for abuse. Legislatively 
determined monetary conditions such as impact fees, but not taxes, 
should be subject to review under state statutory or judicial standards, 
which range from a rational basis test to more stringent tests, such as the 
dual rational nexus test or the Nollan/Dolan test. In the absence of a state 
standard of review, legislatively enacted impact fees challenged in 
federal court should be analyzed under the deferential rational basis test 
for land use regulation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Local officials may abuse their power over land-use regulation, particularly 
when they are involved in individualized decision-making over discrete landowners 
and parcels. A city council’s legislative actions are subject to public hearings and 
are generally directed to resolving issues affecting the community as a whole. But 
when individual decision making is involved, there is considerable concern about 
self-dealing, special interests, and the potential for abuse of power. 1  The 
jurisprudence of land-use regulation addresses this concern by applying differing 
levels of judicial scrutiny to government actions. In challenges to land-use 
regulation, courts more closely scrutinize those situations where government abuse 
is most likely to appear.  
The threat of abuse is most acute when the government requires from property 
owners an exaction, which is a burden—either physical, such as a public easement, 
or monetary—placed on a project as a condition of development approval.2 The U.S. 
Supreme Court “has usually been deferential to state courts and local 
decisionmaking on land use” except in exaction cases,3 most notably Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission4 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.5 These two decisions 
established a heightened scrutiny test for physical exactions demanded by 
government officials to offset the perceived negative impacts from landowners 
seeking development permits in an adjudicatory process.6 The test requires that there 
be an essential nexus and proportionality between the exaction and the negative 
impact caused by the proposed development.7  
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 8  the Court 
unanimously held that the Nollan/Dolan test, which had been developed in the 
context of imposed exactions, also applies to proposed exactions.9 A majority of 
Justices then ruled that Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny that applies to physical 
                                                     
1 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, From Nectow to Koontz: The Supreme Court’s Supervision of 
Land-Use Regulation, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 22 (July 25, 2014) (discussing one theory for closer judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions that “parties who lose from an administrative decision have fewer political roads to correct them than they do in legislative matters”). 
2 Id. at 19. 
3 Id. at 1 (noting that this deference is “appropriate given the Court’s lack of access to local knowledge”). 
4 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
5 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
6 In Nollan, the exaction at issue was a lateral public easement along the landowner’s 
beachfront lot, whereas the city planning commission in Dolan required an easement 
dedicated for a public greenway. In both cases the Court applied heightened scrutiny to such 
“physical” exactions. See supra note 4, at 825 and note 5, at 379–80.   
7  Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact 
of the proposed development.”). 
8 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
9 Id. at 2599.  
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exactions should also be applied to monetary exactions that are demanded in lieu of 
physical property.10 Justice Alito began the majority’s opinion by stating that the 
Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan “provide important protection against the 
misuse of the power of land-use regulation.”11 
The Court could have identified alternative constitutional bases for challenges 
to monetary conditions. One would be a substantive due process claim based on 
unfairness and governed by the deferential rational basis standard. Another would 
be a takings challenge to a severe and disproportionate monetary imposition, 
evaluated under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York12 standard. 
This standard requires courts to balance three factors, including the severity of the 
impact of the monetary demand, the interference with investment-backed 
expectations of the landowner, and the character of the government action.13 For 
example, in an earlier challenge to a monetary imposition, a plurality of the Court 
applied the Penn Central factors in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel14 to find that the 
Coal Act’s imposition of severe and disproportionate retroactive liability constituted 
a taking.15 However, instead of applying either a substantive due process analysis or 
the Penn Central factors to the monetary exaction challenged in Koontz, the Court 
determined that the Nollan/Dolan test provided the appropriate scrutiny.16 Nollan 
and Dolan were deemed to be the applicable decisions because the “direct link 
between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property” required 
scrutiny to address “the risk that the government may use its substantial power and 
discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential 
nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific 
property.”17  
This Article will address the Koontz majority’s holding—subjecting in-lieu 
monetary exactions to the heightened scrutiny test of Nollan/Dolan18—and argue 
                                                     
10 Id. at 2602 (noting that “respondent has maintained throughout this litigation that it 
considered petitioner’s money to be a substitute for his deeding to the public a conservation 
easement on a larger parcel of undeveloped land”). 
11 Id. at 2591. 
12 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
13 Id. at 124. 
14 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
15 Id. at 529–37. It should be noted that Justice Kennedy, who concurred with the 
judgment for Eastern Enterprises, dissented from the takings holding, noting that for 
regulatory takings challenges there must be “a specific property right or interest . . . at stake.” 
Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring with the 
plurality that the Coal Act’s application to Eastern violates due process because of the 
retroactive imposition of financial liability, but dissenting from plurality’s conclusion that 
the statute violated the Takings Clause). 
16 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600. 
17 Id. 
18 See Scott Woodward, The Remedy for a “Nollan/Dolan Unconstitutional Conditions 
Violation,” 38 VT. L. REV. 701, 701 (2014) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions violation and remedy). 
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that this approach fits within the existing state and federal judicial framework used 
to prevent land-use regulatory abuse. However, this Article will also argue that 
legislatively determined impact fees are not monetary exactions and should not be 
subject to Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny. Instead, impact fees should be 
evaluated under existing state standards, which range from rational basis scrutiny to 
more exacting review. 
Much debate and scholarship has followed the Koontz decision.19 Some have 
predicted that the consequences will be dire for local governments if the Court’s 
holding is applied to any monetary fee demanded of developers and possibly to 
environmental regulation as well.20 Justice Kagan’s dissent, which disagreed with 
the majority’s extension of Nollan and Dolan to the payment or expenditure of 
money in government permitting, expressed this concern by avowing that the 
uncertainty of this rule “threatens to subject a vast array of land-use regulations, 
applied daily in States and localities throughout the country, to heightened 
constitutional scrutiny.”21 Others assert varying views including that 1) the Koontz 
decision is a “big yawn” that will have little effect, particularly on environmental 
regulation, which is already governed by environmental impact review;22 2) the 
Koontz majority was wrong to extend the Nollan/Dolan inquiry to monetary 
exactions and instead should have recognized that the claim ultimately rests on 
substantive due process that should be governed by the deferential rational basis 
standard;23 3) similar to the impact of Nollan/Dolan, after Koontz, planners and local 
officials will do a better job of “justifying and documenting the rationale for exacting 
money or land from developers”; 24  4) Koontz created a per se taking when a 
government attaches a monetary obligation to property that cannot be classified as a 
tax;25 5) the Court’s Nollan/Dolan limitations on land-use negotiations “run counter 
                                                     
19 See, e.g., id. at 702 (“The Koontz decision leaves no doubt that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine will remain an integral part of takings law for the foreseeable future. But, 
Koontz resurrects old questions and creates new ones.”). 
20 See Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287. 
21 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
22 See J.B. Ruhl, Koontz: A Big Yawn for Environmental Law?, YOUTUBE (June 24, 2014), http://youtu.be/YbVxU-leFLo [http://perma.cc/K6PY-CJLJ]; see also Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth 
With Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 191, 262 (2006) (observing that the features of environmental impact analysis have been applied to development exactions during the last two decades and that “[t]he impact of the Nollan/Dolan case line appears to have been confined to an extremely narrow set of circumstances—adjudicated or individually-negotiated impact fees—and these cases do not commonly occur”). 
23 See John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573, 585 (2015); see 
also Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 20, at 352–55; Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process 
by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. 
REV. 403, 403 (2014). 
24 Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW. 1, 22–23 (2014) (quoting Professors Ann E. Carlson and Daniel Pollak). 
25 Michael Castle Miller, The New Per Se Takings Rule: Koontz’s Implicit Revolution 
of the Regulatory State, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 923 (2014). 
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to the economic idea that takings jurisprudence makes governments face a higher 
cost for regulation”; 26  and 6) the courts should differentiate between fees and 
expenditures such that heightened scrutiny should apply to fees only where the 
permit applicant is required to directly transfer money to the government, but not to 
expenditures that “require a permit applicant to spend money to carry out mitigation 
activities.” 27  This Article, with the support of others, 28  proposes that in-lieu 
exactions that are individually assessed as part of the permitting process should be 
treated differently than the impact fees that are developed through the legislative 
process and applied equally to all developers without regard to the specific project. 
The purpose in advocating this approach is not to arrive at a particular result, 
either pro-government or pro-developer, but to determine what level of judicial 
scrutiny should be applied to monetary impact fees consistent with the traditional 
land-use regulation framework, based on both state law and U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. This Article does not propose a different approach to evaluating property 
owners’ claims of excessive regulation. Instead, it works within the established 
structure developed by the states and the Court up through the Koontz and Horne v. 
Department of Agriculture29 decisions. While some from both sides of the property 
rights issue have criticized the Court’s jurisprudence in land-use law, this Article 
suggests that the general development of takings law has resulted in a well-reasoned 
approach with one exception, which the Court has now corrected.30 This framework 
                                                     
26 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 45. 27 Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 131 (2014); see also Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2605–06 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority in E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) distinguished “between the appropriation of a specific property interest and the imposition of an order to pay money” and found that a statute requiring a company to pay money for employee health benefits was not a taking, therefore “a requirement that a person pay money to repair public wetlands is not a taking”). But see Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. 2004) (requiring “a developer [to] improve an abutting street at its own expense is in no sense a use restriction” and should be analyzed the same as an exaction in determining whether a taking has occurred). 
28 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 259 (concluding that “[a]djudicative or discretionarily imposed fees will be subjected to the full rigor of Nollan/Dolan analysis while legislative or non-discretionary fees will undergo state constitutional review usually under a form of rational nexus evaluation”); see also Echeverria, supra note 23, at 611 (noting that “there are sound reasons for not extending the ruling in Koontz, which involved an ad hoc calculation of charges, to fees determined through a formula set by statute”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, 
Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2700954 [https://perma.cc/F6X-N7QY] (finding the arguments for the legislative/adjudicative distinction persuasive, but discussing the potential for the secondary effects that “actually impede the goals of progressive property theory”). 
29  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015) (noting that direct 
appropriations of real property and personal property must be treated alike under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
30 See infra notes 70–80 and accompanying text. The first prong of the takings test 
expressed in Agins was later repudiated by the Court in Lingle and held to be a substantive 
due process challenge. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541–45 (2005). 
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was adeptly presented by Justice O’Connor in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.31 and is 
described in flow chart form in Appendix A, which also includes some thoughts as 
to how the analysis of land use takings challenges should be approached. This 
Article maintains that the Court should continue to operate within this framework 
and limit the application of Koontz to “the special context of land-use exactions”32 
rather than extend it to all government regulation as Justice Kagan’s dissent 
portends. In addition, the development of takings law for personal property can 
follow the land-use framework so long as it does not mistakenly use concepts 
developed specifically for real property takings without taking into account the 
context under which these concepts arose.33 
The Article begins by identifying the various levels of scrutiny applied to land-
use decisions and shows how these levels are designed to prevent the abuse of power, 
particularly when actions are exercised at the individualized level. This consistent 
framework supports treating ad hoc in-lieu exactions that require discretionary 
permits differently than uniform monetary fees imposed legislatively. Part II 
compares the scrutiny levels applied to land use actions such as: legislative versus 
administrative actions; spot zoning challenges; consistency with the general plan; 
impermissible delegation of legislative authority; initiative and referendum 
authority; eminent domain challenges; and constitutional challenges, both facial and 
as applied, to corroborate the theme that abuse of power is controlled through 
increased judicial scrutiny when appropriate. Part III discusses the Koontz case and 
explores existing state and federal laws that treat exactions differently than monetary 
impact fees. Part IV briefly reviews expanded regulatory applications of impact fees, 
such as affordable housing techniques, climate change fees, and efforts to address 
environmental resilience and sustainability. 
The Article concludes by suggesting that any physical or monetary in-lieu 
exaction proposed as part of a land-use adjudicative permitting process constitutes 
a permanent physical occupation (or an attempt to evade such an occupation through 
payment of money) under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.34 and is, 
therefore, a per se taking, unless it passes Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny.35 The 
decision in Nollan, expanded by Dolan and Koontz, was based on making an 
exception to the Loretto per se taking rule in situations involving land-use 
permitting. Loretto involved a New York state law that required landlords to permit 
the installation of television cable on their property.36 The Court held that this 
legislative action requiring a permanent physical occupation of private property 
constituted a taking.37 The government action in Loretto did not involve a permitting 
process, whereby permission could be refused, and the government alternatively 
                                                     
31 544 U.S. at 545–48. 
32 Id. at 538. 
33 See infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
34 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
35 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
36 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. 
37 Id. at 438. 
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could condition the grant of the permit on the developer’s willingness to offset 
negative externalities caused by the proposed development. Instead, the legislation 
requiring a permanent physical occupation of a cable was a confiscation of real 
property, albeit a minor one, because it “chop[ped] through the bundle [of property 
rights], taking a slice of every strand.”38 
Legislation or any other government action resulting in the confiscation of real 
property, other than an exaction, would not be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny and 
would instead constitute a per se taking if it caused a permanent physical occupation 
of the property. Similarly, confiscations of personal property should constitute a per 
se Fifth Amendment taking requiring just compensation, provided that the 
government essentially possesses or occupies (and not merely regulates) the 
property. 39  Regulations placed on personal property that are excessive can be 
challenged as a taking and evaluated using the Penn Central factors.40 
Exactions that result in a permanent physical occupation of real property should 
be subject to Nollan/Dolan. However, only administrative, 41  individualized, 
monetary exactions, designed to replace a physical exaction, such as the kind 
involved in Koontz, should be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to control the 
potential for abuse.42 Legislatively determined monetary obligations such as impact 
fees, which are charges imposed on a development to offset the increased service 
                                                     
38 Id. at 435. 
39 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015) (noting that direct 
appropriations of real property and personal property must be treated alike under the Fifth 
Amendment); Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284–87 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding 
that the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 (PRMPA), which 
allowed the government to take possession and control of the Nixon papers constituted a per 
se taking of Mr. Nixon’s personal property and required just compensation). 
40 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (holding that requiring Eastern to 
pay “the expense of lifetime health benefits for miners based on its activities decades before 
those benefits were promised” was a taking). 
41 Judicial review of administrative decisions is stricter than review of decisions that 
are legislative in nature. See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468 
(7th Cir. 1988). 
42 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013) (citing Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (stating that “when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such as a bank account or parcel of real property, a ‘per se [takings] approach’ is the proper mode of analysis”)). For a very similar approach, see Colorado’s Regulatory Impairment of Property Rights Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-201 to 29-20-205 (2008), which is described and interpreted in Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d 875, 878–79 (Colo. App. 2008) (explaining that the Act was enacted to codify federal and state constitutional protections against regulatory takings like those in Nollan and Dolan and is triggered only if 1) the action imposes conditions upon the grant of land use approval and 2) either requires the landowner to dedicate real property “or pay money or provide services to a public entity in an amount that is determined on an individual and discretionary basis”). 
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requirement,43 but not taxes, should be subject to review under state law standards, 
which range from a reasonableness test to more stringent tests under statutory or 
judicial determinations. A majority of states apply the dual rational nexus test to 
impact fees. This test was developed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v. 
Village of Menomonee Falls,44 and has been described as two steps: 1) there must 
be a rational nexus “‘between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth 
in population generated by the subdivision,’” and 2) a rational nexus “‘between the 
expenditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.’”45 
While this test may be similar to the Nollan/Dolan test, which requires that there be 
an essential nexus and proportionality between the exaction requested and the 
impact caused by the development sought, the dual rational nexus test requires that 
the impact fee does not exceed the cost of the infrastructure required by the 
development and that the development receives a benefit from the infrastructure.46 
The dual rational nexus test is aimed at preventing the government from using 
legislative fees instead of taxes, which it may not have the power to impose, to 
support the community infrastructure by burdening only the newcomers without an 
associated benefit to those being burdened. This test for impact fees seeks to ensure 
that the money collected through legislative fees is actually spent to address the 
impact on infrastructure allegedly caused by the development, instead of being 
placed in a general revenue account. The Nollan/Dolan test was developed to 
prevent the government from individually exacting physical or monetary 
concessions from a developer during the permitting process and aims to prevent the 
government from essentially extorting property from developers that is not related 
to the development’s actual impact. While the difference between these tests may 
not yield a different result, states should have the freedom to maintain the dual 
rational nexus test or any other level of scrutiny they deem appropriate for reviewing 
challenges to legislative action. 
In the absence of a state standard of review, legislatively enacted impact fees 
challenged in federal court should be analyzed under the traditional rational basis 
test for land-use regulation.47 Even assuming that a legislatively enacted impact fee 
can pass a deferential rational basis test or the dual rational nexus test, landowners 
can still challenge these fees as legislation that has gone too far and assert a takings 
challenge for evaluation under the Penn Central factors, which examine the severity 
                                                     
43 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 11-36a-102 (West 2012) (“‘Impact fee’ means a payment 
of money imposed upon new development activity as a condition of development approval 
to mitigate the impact of the new development on public infrastructure.”). 
44 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). 
45 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 225–26 (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 
431 So. 2d 606, 611–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the second prong of the test 
will not be satisfied unless “the ordinance . . . specifically earmark[s] the funds collected for 
use in acquiring capital facilities to benefit the new residents”)).  
46 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 260. 47  FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 37 (observing the resistance of federal courts to get involved in litigating land use regulations because “the reasonableness of each party’s claims is difficult to assess without local knowledge that is difficult to transmit to higher courts”). 
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of the impact on the property owner, the interference with the owner’s investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the government action.48 Economically, 
the regulatory impact on the property owner is the same, regardless of whether it is 
a legislative or adjudicative action, and is subject to challenge as a regulatory taking. 
However, applying heightened scrutiny to these actions, instead of a rational basis 
review, is justified when there is a potential for government to misbehave. Accepting 
the Supreme Court’s “attempt to supervise bargaining between regulators and 
landowners in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz,”49 the decision by the Koontz majority to 
subject monetary exactions to greater scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan is consistent with 
the state courts’ historic struggle to police the exercise of discretion in the land-use 
field.50 This Article distinguishes the level of judicial scrutiny required for this type 
of individualized, monetary exaction from that of legislatively enacted impact fees. 
II.  LEVELS OF SCRUTINY CONTROLLING ABUSE OF POWER 
 
The starting premise for judicial review of local government land-use 
regulation is that the use of police power is presumed to be constitutionally valid.51 
This traditional judicial deference may be modified, as it was in the Dolan decision, 
in order to monitor adjudicative decisions.52 Certain government land-use actions 
may go astray from the rule of law because they are adjudicated or negotiated 
through individualized, case-by-case decision-making. 53  Professors Fennell and 
Peñalver examine these deviations in the exactions context and determine that 
because of the concern about arbitrariness, favoritism, and corruption, “the Court 
might be understood [in its exaction decisions] as attempting to structure bargaining 
between governments and developers in ways that increase the conformity of that 
                                                     
48 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
49 See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 46 (concluding that this supervision “does not appear to be a helpful way to rationalize the web of local regulation”). 
50 See id. at 4 (noting that “[z]oning is the product of state law” and common-law adjudication has promoted “[c]ross-state similarities” that has “generated a national framework for zoning”); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for 
Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751, 762 (2009) (“[S]tate courts, not federal courts, should be centrally responsible for limiting eminent domain abuses by state and local agencies.”). 
51 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 241 (citing Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
52 Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994) (stating that because the decision to condition the building permit was adjudicative in nature, the burden rests on the city to prove validity)).  
53 Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 20, at 312 (referencing Lon Fuller’s “eight ways that state action may deviate from the rule of law. Those are: (1) a failure to generate generally applicable rules (‘generality’), ‘so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis;’ (2) a failure to publicize the law; (3) excessive use of retroactive legislation; (4) the use of rules that are not intelligible; (5) the enactment of rules that contradict one another; (6) use of rules that are beyond the power of the regulated party to follow; (7) changing rules too frequently; and (8) permitting ‘a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration’”). 
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bargaining to the formal requirements of the rule of law.” 54  Concerns about 
excessive government discretion and the potential for abuse may justify heightened 
scrutiny of exactions, but these concerns also support state-law standards of 
increased scrutiny over administrative decisions, spot zoning, contract zoning, 
piecemeal rezoning, variances and conditional uses, and in some states, the standard 
of review for due process claims.55 
In Exactions Creep, Fennell and Peñalver focus on exactions and only lightly 
touch upon the state-law standards.56  They offer several alternatives for a path 
toward addressing the “confused and unsustainable state” of exactions and takings 
jurisprudence resulting from the Court’s decision in Koontz.57 These alternatives 
include 1) relying on the legislative/adjudicative distinction to determine heightened 
scrutiny; 2) applying heightened scrutiny to everything except taxes and fees; 3) 
applying other approaches to determine whether heightened scrutiny will be 
triggered, such as looking at the nature of the burden itself, distinguishing between 
payments to the government and expenditures to your own property, and reviewing 
the multiple options presented by the government; 4) applying heightened scrutiny 
to all land-use regulations; or 5) removing exactions from the takings analysis and 
instead analyzing them under substantive due process or based upon state-law 
doctrines.58 
This Article advocates for a hybrid approach that employs several of the 
alternatives presented by Fennell and Peñalver. It uses the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction and relies upon state land-use doctrines to fill the interstices between 
current federal takings and exaction law and questions unanswered by Koontz.59 In 
support of this approach, Part II discusses in detail the various state law doctrines 
and some federal law standards that are applied to land-use actions to determine 
whether judicial scrutiny of government action should be deferential or require 
heightened scrutiny. This Part also addresses the rudiments of land-use law, 
including: (A) legislative versus administrative actions; (B) spot zoning challenges 
and conformity to the general plan; (C) the impermissible delegation of legislative 
power; (D) neighborhood zoning and consent requirements, initiative and 
referendum authority, and how the people can also “behave badly” through ballot-
box zoning; (E) eminent domain challenges; and (F) facial versus applied 
challenges, and the challenges to regulatory land-use actions that impact First 
Amendment rights, including religious exercise. The established and underlying 
framework of land-use law has, at its roots, the desire to prevent unfair dealing and 
                                                     
54 Id. at 24. 
55 Id. at 59–60. 56 Id. 
57 See id. at 46–60. 
58 Id. 59 See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 242–43 (noting that state law adequately limits development exactions and “remains as the main source of policy and legal guidance for impact fee practices[,]” allowing states to control their own policies). 
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abuse that may result when government officials have too much discretion and stray 
from the rule of law. 
A.  The Legislative vs. Administrative Distinction 
 
Legislative action in local government has traditionally received strong 
deference when subjected to judicial challenge. The challenger has the burden of 
showing that the government entity did not have a rational basis for exercising its 
police power to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the 
community.60 This deference is given because legislative action generally affects 
larger areas of the community without regard to who owns the property interests 
being regulated. In addition, legislative actors are subject to the electorate voicing 
support or criticism.61 
Administrative, also called adjudicative or quasi-judicial, actions tend to affect 
individual landowners and are, therefore, considered susceptible to government 
favoritism or discrimination.62 While the government entity is still held to providing 
a rational basis for its decision, it has the burden of showing that substantial evidence 
supported its decision.63 When defending legislative actions, the government need 
only supply a rational basis for its action, even if the rationale is presented for the 
first time at trial. 64  Conversely, when defending administrative actions, the 
government must show substantial evidence of a rationale at the time the action was 
originally taken.65 
Zoning regulation is a legislative process and receives deferential treatment by 
the courts.66 Rezoning is typically considered legislative in nature, but there are 
some states that require closer scrutiny and treat it as administrative if it involves a 
                                                     
60 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395–96. 
61 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 219. 
62 While this Article groups administrative and quasi-judicial decisions together for 
purposes of distinguishing these actions from legislative action, it should be noted that 
administrative decisions may be considered ministerial or nondiscretionary action that may 
not require a hearing, but that quasi-judicial actions do require discretion and thus will 
require a hearing. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 161 
(6th ed. 2012) (noting that other consequences such as government immunity may follow the 
determination of whether a decision is administrative or quasi-judicial). 
63 The requirement that administrative decisions be “supported by substantial evidence” 
is also asserted in federal administrative law cases. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 
Ga., 135 S. Ct. 808, 818–19 (2015) (holding that federal administrative law doctrines apply 
to state and local governments in and under the Federal Communications Act, and local 
governments have power over siting and zoning of cell towers, but must meet certain federal 
limitations, including the requirement to support its denial of wireless infrastructure requests 
in a writing supported by substantial evidence). 
64 F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
65 United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963). 
66 Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 571 (1980). 
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single landowner, or small number of landowners.67 Rezoning that individually 
affects landowners, either positively or negatively, can also be challenged as “spot 
zoning,” discussed below, and may require increased scrutiny.68 
The grant or denial of a conditional-use permit or a variance request will be 
treated as administrative and requires substantial evidence in the file to support the 
decision made by the government.69 In many municipalities, there will be different 
governmental bodies making either the legislative or the administrative decisions. 
City councils will serve as the legislative bodies, and boards of adjustment or 
planning commissions may serve as the administrative entities. Courts sometimes 
look to the body making the decision to determine whether it was legislative or 
administrative in nature, but in some regions the same governmental body, most 
likely the city council, will make all of the decisions. Thus, courts must look to both 
the nature of the government body making the decision and to the nature of the 
decision itself and whether it impacts an individual landowner or landowners in 
general.70 
While many courts have recognized the distinction between legislative and 
administrative actions, some courts and scholars have challenged this distinction and 
have supported increasing the scrutiny of government decision-making regardless 
of the classification.71 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in both Dolan and Lingle 
                                                     
67 Id. 
68 See infra Section II.B. 
69 Arnel, 620 P.2d at 569. 
70 See 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(contrasting the Second and Seventh Circuit tests for determining whether an action is 
legislative or adjudicatory). 
71 See Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640–41 (Tex. 2004) (noting that despite the justification given by the California Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002), for applying the Dolan standard to adjudicative decisions only, the Texas Supreme Court is “not convinced” that a “workable distinction can always be drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative”); James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary 
Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 410 (2009) (noting difference between legislative and administrative actions is negligible); Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land Use Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10100, 10104 (2000) (stating that there is difficultly in distinguishing legislative from administrative actions); Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the 
Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 488–89 (2006) (noting that no constitutional difference exists between legislative and administrative takings); Gideon Kanner, Tennis Anyone? How California Judges Made Land Ransom and Art Censorship 
Legal, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 214, 230 (1997) (discussing the Ehrlich decision and criticizing the view that Nollan and Dolan should not apply if the exaction is imposed by ordinance, rather than by an individualized decision, reasoning that “the constitutionality of an exaction would depend not on its legitimacy or its impact, but only on the identity of the municipal body demanding it”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 537–39 (2012) (noting the difficulty of “drawing a line between ‘legislative’ and ‘adjudicative’ exactions” and that the Nollan and Dolan facts involve legislative, not adjudicative decisions); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 279, 288–89 (2011) (stating that the nexus and proportionality of legislative and administrative tests is subject to debate); see also Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of 
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has endorsed this distinction between legislative and adjudicative land-use 
regulations.72  The Court in Dolan distinguished the land-use regulations it had 
upheld in its earlier decisions in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,73 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 74  and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 75  from the 
unconstitutional conditions imposed on the landowners in Nollan and Dolan based 
on the fact that its earlier decisions “involved essentially legislative determinations 
classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here [Dolan] the city made an 
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on 
an individual parcel.”76 The Court in Lingle found this distinction relevant when it 
described its exactions jurisprudence from “Nollan and Dolan as involving 
‘adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a 
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a 
condition of obtaining a development permit.’”77 
A landowner who complains of being treated unfairly by local land-use officials 
will typically frame a judicial challenge as a violation of substantive due process.78 
Federal courts are generally unfriendly to such challenges, as expressed by Judge 
Posner in the Seventh Circuit case Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates.79 
 
This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the 
trappings of constitutional law—a sure sign of masquerade being that the 
plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of the zoning ordinances 
of the Village of Hoffman Estates but argue rather than [sic] the Board of 
Trustees had no authority under those ordinances to reject their site plan 
once the Village Plan Commission had approved it. If the plaintiffs can 
get us to review the merits of the Board of Trustees’ decision under state 
law, we cannot imagine what zoning dispute could not be shoehorned into 
federal court in this way, there to displace or postpone consideration of 
some worthier object of federal judicial solicitude. Something more is 
necessary than dissatisfaction with the rejection of a site plan to turn a 
                                                     
Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.”). 
72 See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 533–34. 
73 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
74 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 75 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
76 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also Mulvaney, Exactions for 
the Future, supra note 71, at 533–34 (noting that “the Court strongly implied—if not expressly declared—that the strictures of Dolan (and by implication Nollan) are inapplicable to exactions that are part of a community plan and broadly applicable”). 
77  Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 534 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546–47 (2005)). 
78  See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing the highly deferential view of substantive due process challenges with the test being “whether the regulation has a rational basis or a reasonable relation to the traditional police-power purposes of zoning, promotion of the health, safety, and general welfare of the community”). 
79 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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zoning case into a federal case; and it should go without saying that the 
something more cannot be merely a violation of state (or local) law. A 
violation of state law is not a denial of due process of law.80 
 
Judge Posner also discussed the legislative/administrative distinction and noted 
that this “difference is critical” because judicial review of legislative decisions is 
much broader than the review of zoning decisions that are adjudicative in nature.81 
In addition to the Seventh Circuit approach to land-use substantive due process 
claims, other federal courts have given great deference to zoning decisions, requiring 
the plaintiff to show that the decision was outrageously arbitrary or so unfair that it 
“shock[s] the conscience of the court.”82 
In Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 83  the Court corrected its earlier confusion 
between takings claims and substantive due process challenges, 84  so that the 
government need only show that it has acted rationally to defeat a due process 
challenge. Litigants who believe that unfair or arbitrary regulation has devalued their 
property will seek just compensation as a taking rather than invalidation under due 
process.85 Such a takings challenge to legislative action will be analyzed using the 
Penn Central factors (severity of the impact, interference with investment-backed 
expectations, and character of the government action),86 unless the property owner 
                                                     
80 Id. at 467 (citations omitted). 
81 Id. at 468; see also FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that administrative decisions are scrutinized “more carefully because, goes one theory, parties who lose from an administrative decision have fewer political roads to correct them than they do in legislative matters”). 
82 See Cenergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1, LLC v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2014) (“On the issue of arbitrariness, we have said that a land-use decision must ‘shock the conscience’ to run afoul of the Constitution. Bettendorf v. St. Croix County, 631 F.3d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 2011). We also have suggested that the action must have been ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ Centres, 148 F.3d at 704, or ‘random and irrational,’ General Auto 
Service Station, 526 F.3d at 1000. In yet another formulation, the Supreme Court has explained that a land-use decision must be arbitrary to the point of being ‘egregious’ to implicate substantive due process. Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 198, 123 S. Ct. 1389. These standards should not be viewed as distinct, at least in the land-use context. In Cuyahoga 
Falls, the Supreme Court relied upon County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), for the proposition that ‘only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense’ (internal quotation marks omitted), and Lewis itself, see 523 U.S. at 855, 118 S. Ct. 1708, applied the ‘shock the conscience’ standard.”); DANIEL K. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 2.39, 2.46 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2005) (citing, e.g., Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 259 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding it is “outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority”); Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating harassment, delays, and improper application of subdivision regulations does not shock the conscience). 
83 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
84 Id. at 548. 
85 See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that “[t]he case that is now regarded as the lodestar of regulatory takings, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), was originally discussed in the legal literature as a due process case”). 
86 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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can show that a per se taking has occurred under either Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp.,87 which requires a permanent physical invasion of real 
property, or Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council,88 which addresses regulation 
that deprives owners of all economically beneficial use of their real property. In 
Lingle, the Court addressed a takings challenge to a statutory rent cap on leases of 
gasoline service stations and determined that one of the two prongs of a takings test 
developed by the Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon89 was not an appropriate test for 
a taking.90 Whereas in Agins, the Court declared that “[t]he application of a general 
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically 
viable use of his land,”91 the Lingle Court reclassified the “substantially advances” 
prong from a takings test to a substantive due process claim. However, the Court 
retained the Nollan/Dolan takings test for exactions even though it was originally 
developed from the Agins “substantially advances” takings test.92 This remaining 
incongruity gives fodder to those who argue that Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz should 
be treated as substantive due process, not takings, challenges.93 
The Koontz decision held that individualized monetary exactions would be 
subject to Nollan/Dolan, but did not resolve the question of whether legislatively 
enacted monetary fees would also be scrutinized under this higher standard.94 The 
controversy over the legislative/administrative distinction remains,95 even though it 
has been observed that:  
  
                                                     
87 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
88 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
89 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
90 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). 
91 447 U.S. at 260 (emphases added). 
92 544 U.S. at 547–48. 
93  Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 543–48 (discussing the relationship between due process and takings review). See generally Fennell & Peñalver, 
supra note 20, at 291 (distinguishing takings challenges and due process challenges).  
94 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013). 
95 See Eagle, supra note 24, at 6 (observing that the major issue “left unanswered after 
Koontz is whether the doctrine applies not only to adjudicative decisions by administrators but also to legislative determinations”); Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a 
Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 754–55 (2007) (noting the need for heightened scrutiny because there is a greater risk of unfair bargaining with individualized exactions than with legislative assessments); John Martinez, 
What Color Is the Number Seven? Category Mistake Analysis and the “Legislative/Non-
Legislative” Distinction, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 11–20 (2014) (discussing the difficulty in appropriately distinguishing between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative situations and examining the theory of category mistake in using the legislative/nonlegislative distinction in the exactions setting); Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative 
Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 266 (2000) (observing that perhaps lower courts have been confused in interpreting Dolan because of the difficulty of distinguishing legislative from adjudicative decisions). 
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With near uniformity, lower courts applying Dolan to monetary exactions 
have done so only when the exaction has been imposed through an 
adjudicatory process; they have expressly declined to use Dolan’s 
heightened scrutiny in testing development or impact fees imposed on 
broad classes of property pursuant to legislatively adopted fee schemes.96 
 
As previously noted, not everyone has accepted the relevance of the distinction 
between legislative and individualized government actions in all situations.97 For 
example, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture,98 the Ninth Circuit applied the 
Nollan/Dolan test to a raisin marketing restriction that was legislatively enacted and 
directed to all who sent raisins into the stream of commerce.99 The court noted that 
“[i]ndividualized review makes sense in the land-use context because the 
development of each parcel is considered on a case-by-case basis[,]” but it applied 
the Nollan/Dolan test to the legislative action in the raisin case, partly because 
“raisins are fungible (as opposed to land, which is unique).”100 In an earlier footnote, 
the court explained that:  
 
We do not mean to suggest that all use restrictions concerning personal 
property must comport with Nollan and Dolan. Rather, we hold Nollan 
and Dolan provide an appropriate framework to decide this case given the 
                                                     
96 Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Wash. Cty., 45 P.3d 966, 977 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis in original); see also McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding alternatively that if it did constitute a monetary exaction it would not be subject to 
Nollan/Dolan, subjecting a storm pipe requirement to Penn Central review rather than 
Nollan/Dolan test because regulation does not create a monetary exaction, but instead “provides an across-the-board requirement for all new developments”); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001) (noting that “[o]ne critical difference between a legislatively based fee and a specific, discretionary adjudicative determination is that the risk of leveraging or extortion on the part of the government is virtually nonexistent in a fee system”); Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d 875, 879–80 (Colo. App. 2008), aff’d, 220 P.3d 559 (Colo. 2009) (discussing that drainage requirements imposed on landowners were legislatively determined so that the Regulatory Impairment of Property Rights Act requiring Nollan/Dolan scrutiny was not applicable because the monetary fee was not “determined on an individual and discretionary basis”). 
97 See Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 515 U.S. 1116, 1116–18 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “lower courts are in conflict over whether Dolan’s test for property regulation should be applied in cases where the alleged taking occurs through an Act of the legislature” and eschewing the “distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings”); B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1168–69, 1171 (Utah 2006) (noting that although recent legislation provides that all exactions, whether legislative or adjudicative, must be subject to the rough proportionality test derived from Nollan/Dolan, Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-507 (Supp. 2005) could not be applied retroactively and “we are hard pressed to find a reason to assume that the legislative view of the proper scope of the rough proportionality test would have been different before section 17-27a-507 went into effect”). 
98 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
99 Id. at 1144. 
100 Id. 
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significant but not total loss of the Hornes’ possessory and dispositional 
control over their reserved raisins.101 
 
The court determined that requiring all raisin producers to reserve a certain 
percentage of their crop in order to regulate prices, was not a seizure of their crops, 
but was instead a condition on the use of their crops, subject to Nollan/Dolan.102  
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in Horne and held 
that the government’s duty to pay just compensation for a physical per se taking 
applies to personal property as well as to real property, and that the Raisin Marketing 
Order at issue was a per se taking under Loretto.103 The Court’s decision in Horne 
makes it clear that there is no distinction between real and personal property for 
determining if the private property is subject to a per se taking. The more appropriate 
distinction should be between what is considered a confiscation of real or personal 
property and what is considered a regulation of real or personal property.  
The legislation at issue in Loretto was challenged as a regulatory taking, but 
because of the nature of the action in requiring a permanent and physical occupation 
of the property, the Court held it to be a per se taking, a confiscation, not subject to 
the Penn Central balancing factors.104 A similar distinction between confiscation 
and regulation of personal property was evident in the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Nixon v. United States,105 which held that the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act (“PRMPA”) was a per se taking of President Nixon’s personal 
property because the government took complete possession and control of Nixon’s 
papers.106 The court noted that “[a]lthough a great public interest may justify a 
taking, it does not convert the taking into mere regulation.” 107  The court 
distinguished between a regulation that might affect Nixon’s property rights and the 
application of the PRMPA statute, which took away his right to exclude, and left 
Nixon with only a few rights in the materials that were “so fractured that his original 
property interest has been destroyed.”108 
In the context of land-use permitting, the distinction between confiscation and 
regulation of real property is less clear. In Nollan, the Court determined that the 
easement sought by the California Coastal Commission to cross the Nollans’ 
beachfront property was a “‘permanent physical occupation’” under the Loretto rule 
of per se taking because the public is given “a permanent and continuous right to 
                                                     
101 Id. at 1141 n.18. 
102 Id. at 1144. 
103 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015) (noting that direct 
appropriations of real property and personal property must be treated alike under the Fifth 
Amendment).  
104 Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438–40 (1982). 
105 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
106 Id. at 1284. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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pass to and fro.”109 Requiring the Nollans to give the state an easement would be a 
confiscation of property requiring just compensation.110 However, in the context of 
the permit process, the Court addressed the question of whether requiring the 
easement as a condition for granting a land-use permit would still result in a 
taking.111 Because the Coastal Commission could refuse to issue the permit if the 
development would interfere with the public’s right to use the beach, the Court 
agreed with the Commission that “a permit condition that serves the same legitimate 
police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a 
taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking.”112  The 
Nollan/Dolan framework was based on the concept that a physical exaction is a per 
se taking under Loretto, but because the exaction is part of a permitting process 
whereby the government could refuse to grant the permit, the government can 
instead place conditions on the permit in order to offset the externalities created by 
the development.  
The Nollan/Dolan test was developed to increase the scrutiny for physical 
exactions because of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the concern about 
individual permitting and the potential for governmental abuse of power.113 Koontz 
extended Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to monetary exactions, which seems appropriate 
because even though it is not a physical invasion of real property, money is being 
sought in lieu of the physical exaction. The Koontz Court expressed concerns about 
the ease by which land-use permitting officials could “evade the limitations of 
Nollan and Dolan” if review is not applied to in-lieu exactions.114  
The Ninth Circuit should not have applied the Nollan/Dolan analysis in Horne 
based on the reasoning of Koontz, but instead should have determined whether the 
Raisin Marketing Order was a confiscation of raisins or a regulation of raisin 
handlers. Based on the framework that has been established for land-use regulation, 
applying the Nollan/Dolan test to a personal property takings challenge would be 
appropriate only if there were an administrative permitting process whereby the 
government could refuse approval to allow a use of personal property (without such 
refusal constituting a taking), but instead condition its approval on the property 
owner’s willingness to turn over personal property in exchange for the permit. 
Horne, on the other hand, did not involve an exaction—either physical or 
                                                     
109 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987). 
110 Id. at 841–42. 
111 Id. at 834. 
112 Id. at 835–36. 
113 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (quoting Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (noting that Nollan and Dolan “involve a special 
application of the ‘doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,’ which provides that ‘the 
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to 
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a 
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no 
relationship to the property’”)). 
114 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013). 
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monetary—and it is unrelated to land-use regulation with the accompanying 
concerns about abuse of the government’s discretion in granting permits.115 Instead, 
as held by the Supreme Court, the Raisin Marketing Order constituted a confiscation 
of the product and resulted in a per se taking under Loretto.116 If the Order had been 
determined to be a regulation of personal property, the takings challenge would have 
been analyzed using the Penn Central factors examining the severity of the impact, 
the interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action, and not Nollan/Dolan because the raisins were not being 
regulated as part of a permitting process. 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Horne of treating a legislatively enacted 
restriction on personal property as a monetary exaction subject to the Nollan/Dolan 
test was also applied to an affordable housing regulation in Levin v. City and County 
of San Francisco. 117  In Levin, the federal district court held that an ordinance 
requiring property owners to pay a lump sum amount to displaced tenants before 
they are permitted to withdraw rent-controlled property from the rental market was 
facially unconstitutional as a taking of property because it failed to meet the 
Nollan/Dolan standard for monetary exactions.118 The court was not persuaded by 
the City’s argument that Nollan/Dolan analysis does not apply to a facial takings 
claim nor does it apply to legislatively imposed exactions.119 Instead, the Levin court 
referenced the Ninth Circuit’s Horne decision as “reinforc[ing] the applicability of 
the Nollan/Dolan framework to facial reviews of legislative exactions.” 120  In 
contrast, the California Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County 
of San Francisco121 (another case involving affordable housing in San Francisco) 
noted: 
 
While legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper 
leveraging, such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary 
restraints of the democratic political process. A city council that charged 
extortionate fees for all property development, unjustifiable by mitigation 
needs, would likely face widespread and well-financed opposition at the 
next election. Ad hoc individual monetary exactions deserve special 
                                                     
115 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430–31 (distinguishing Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) on the basis that Monsanto received a “valuable 
Government benefit” to sell hazardous chemicals in exchange for turning over safety 
information, including trade secret property interests; whereas in Horne, as in Nollan, the 
takings at issue were not part of a voluntary exchange, but were instead “basic and familiar 
uses of property”—the right to “[s]ell[] produce in interstate commerce” and “the right to 
build on one’s own property”).  
116 Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2430. 
117 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
118 Id. at 1084 (finding that the “Ordinance on its face fails both the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests”). 119 Id. at 1083 n.4. 
120 Id. at 1083–84 n.4. 
121 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002). 
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judicial scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer citizens and evading 
systematic assessment, they are more likely to escape such political 
controls.122 
 
San Francisco may have overreached in its affordable-housing legislation 
challenged in Levin, but the takings challenge should have been analyzed using 
Loretto, if the required payment to displaced tenants constituted a confiscation,123 or 
using the Penn Central factors if the housing ordinance is considered to be 
regulation. 
The Levin court also dismissed the “City’s reliance on McClung v. City of 
Sumner,124 . . . for the argument that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to legislative 
conditions,” by noting Koontz’s abrogation of “McClung’s holding that 
Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions.” 125  In McClung, the 
landowners needed a permit to develop a Subway sandwich shop and parking lot, 
but the existing storm drain was not sufficient.126 The City ordinance required all 
landowners to install a twelve-inch storm drain, but the City offered the McClungs 
a reduction of permitting fees if they would install a twenty-four-inch storm drain 
instead.127 The Ninth Circuit considered the ordinance requiring all landowners to 
install a twelve-inch storm drain to be a legislative act, subject to the Penn Central 
test for any takings claim analysis, because it was a generally applicable 
development requirement to address flooding.128 The court held that the McClungs 
impliedly contracted to install the twenty-four-inch drain, so it was unnecessary to 
decide whether this individualized request would be subject to Nollan/Dolan 
scrutiny.129 It also disagreed with the landowners’ characterization of the twelve-
inch drain requirement as a monetary exaction, but stated that even if it could be so 
characterized, monetary exactions are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan test.130 
Unfortunately, it is not clear from the Koontz decision whether McClung was 
abrogated because of its statement that monetary exactions are not subject to 
Nollan/Dolan or because it distinguished between legislative and administrative 
actions in order to determine the review standard.131 The Levin court rejected the 
                                                     
122 Id. at 105. 
123 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430. But see Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1080–81 (noting that Loretto is not applicable because “the government effects a physical 
taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his 
land”). 
124 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008). 
125 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 n.4. 
126 548 F.3d at 1222. 
127 Id. at 1222–23. 128 Id. at 1227. 
129 Id. at 1228. 
130 Id. 
131 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594 (“[A] division of authority over whether a demand for money can give rise to a claim under Nollan and Dolan, and sided with those courts that have said it cannot.” (comparing, e.g., McClung, 548 F.3d at 1228, with Ehrlich v. City of 
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significance of the legislative distinction based on Koontz’s abrogation of 
McClung’s holding that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions.132 
However, the Koontz decision itself points out the division of authority over 
monetary exactions and compares McClung to the Ehrlich v. City of Culver City133 
decision.134 In Ehrlich, the City required the developer to provide funds to mitigate 
the loss of public recreation in exchange for permitting the conversion of a private 
tennis club and recreational facility to a condominium development. 135  The 
California Supreme Court determined that monetary exactions must be scrutinized 
under the Nollan/Dolan standard and remanded to the City the question of whether 
the monetary exaction was justified.136 However, it did uphold an impact fee for art 
in public places as a regulatory fee not subject to Nollan/Dolan review.137  
In contrast to McClung, the Ehrlich court did subject monetary exactions to the 
Nollan/Dolan test, but Ehrlich also used the legislative/administrative distinction to 
differentiate between the legislative fees for art that were not subject to 
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny,138 and the administrative request for a monetary exaction for 
recreation that was subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.139 If this issue is presented to 
the Ninth Circuit at some point in the future, further clarity—or confusion—may be 
introduced into this controversy. 140  Not only will the Ninth Circuit need to 
reexamine its application of Nollan/Dolan to legislation involving personal property 
after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Horne, but it will also need to take into 
consideration the California Supreme Court’s holding in California Building 
                                                     
Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996) (citing Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 640–641 (Tex. 2004)). 
132 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 n.4. 
133 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). 
134 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
135 Erhlich, 911 P.2d at 434–35 (holding that this monetary exaction was imposed after 
the City determined it could not afford to purchase the parcel outright for public recreation).  
136 Id. at 449–50. 
137 Id. at 450. 
138 See id. at 450 (agreeing with the city “that the art in public places fee is not a development exaction of the kind subject to the Nollan–Dolan takings analysis” and finding it “more akin to traditional land use regulations imposing minimal building setbacks, parking and lighting conditions, landscaping requirements, and other design conditions such as color schemes, building materials and architectural amenities”). 
139 Id. at 447 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124) (“[I]t is not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard of scrutiny) of Nollan and 
Dolan applies to cases in which the exaction takes the form of a generally applicable development fee or assessment—cases in which the courts have deferred to legislative and political processes to formulate ‘public program[s] adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good . . . .’ But when a local government imposes special, discretionary permit conditions on development by individual property owners—as in the case of the recreational fee at issue in this case—Nollan and Dolan require that such conditions, whether they consist of possessory dedications or monetary exactions, be scrutinized under the heightened standard.”). 
140 Koontz and San Francisco Rent Control, TAKINGSLITIGATION.COM (Oct. 26, 2014), http://takingslitigation.com/2014/10/26/koontz-and-san-francisco-rent-control/ [http://perma.cc/W7CN-7DXE]. 
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Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 141  which distinguished affordable housing 
ordinances that address specific adverse impacts caused by the developers, from 
legislative regulation of land use based on the broader public interest.142 Finally, the 
Ninth Circuit may need to address its earlier opinion in Commercial Builders of 
Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 143  which applied Nollan to city 
legislation requiring the payment of a fee for nonresidential building permits to 
expand low-income housing in order to offset the burdens of low-income workers 
coming to the city to fill the jobs created.144 This case was decided before the Dolan 
decision and the court found a nexus under Nollan between the development and fee 
provision.145  The court affirmed the district court decision that the low-income 
housing fee was not an unconstitutional taking because there was a nexus between 
the fee and the impact from commercial development.146  
The better interpretation of Koontz’s abrogation of McClung is that it was based 
on McClung’s suggestion that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions, 
rather than because McClung distinguished between legislative and administrative 
actions and subjected legislative actions to Penn Central. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel147 observed that “economic regulation such as the 
Coal Act may . . . effect a taking,”148 but should nonetheless be evaluated under the 
three Penn Central factors because the retroactive liability of the company for retired 
miners is not a permanent physical occupation of the company’s property and does 
not constitute a per se taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp.149 As briefly discussed earlier in the Introduction, the plurality in Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel applied the three-factor test developed in Penn Central to 
analyze the constitutionality of the retroactive liability.150 Noting that the Penn 
Central test was also applied to multiemployer pension plan liability in Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,151 the plurality in Eastern Enterprises concluded 
“that the Coal Act’s application to Eastern effects an unconstitutional taking.”152 
                                                     
141 Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 
2016 WL 763863 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (noting that 
while “this case does not present an opportunity to resolve the conflict[]” as to “whether 
cities can legislatively impose exactions that would not pass muster if done 
administratively[,]” the Court should decide “what legal standard governs legislative 
ordinances” in order to resolve this uncertainty for local governments). 
142 See extended discussion in Part III, infra notes 399–411. 
143 Comm’l Builders of No. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
144 Id. at 873. 
145 Id. at 874 (noting that Nollan did not materially change the requirement that the 
legislation be “reasonably related to legitimate public purposes”). 
146 Id. at 875–76. 
147 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
148 Id. at 523. 
149 Id. at 529–30. 
150 Id. at 529–37. 
151 475 U.S. 211 (1986). 
152 524 U.S. at 537. 
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However, Justice Kennedy, who concurred with the judgment for Eastern 
Enterprises based on a due process violation, dissented from the taking holding, 
asserting that for regulatory takings challenges there must be “a specific property 
right or interest . . . at stake.”153 Thus, legislatively developed economic regulation 
can constitute a taking, but should be analyzed under the Loretto standard, the three-
factor Penn Central framework, or even as a Lucas per se taking if the facts justify, 
rather than under the Nollan/Dolan standard. 
Recognizing the distinction between generalized legislative regulation and 
adjudicative administrative government action may be the key to limiting the scope 
of heightened judicial scrutiny over monetary fees following the Koontz decision. 
The controversy over the relevance of this distinction has existed for years before 
the Court’s decision in Koontz to treat monetary exactions the same as physical 
exactions.154 These conflicting views as to whether the nexus and proportionality 
test will apply not only to physical exactions, but to legislatively imposed fees, such 
as conservation restrictions and impact fees, remain following the Koontz decision 
to subject “monetary exactions” to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.155 The Nollan/Dolan test 
was developed as an exception to Loretto based on the bargaining nature of 
permitting, which would allow the government to deny the permit, so long as it does 
not constitute a taking under Penn Central, or condition the grant of the permit so 
long as the condition passes Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. The Nollan/Dolan test should 
not be applied outside the context of either physical or monetary exaction conditions 
imposed during the land-use permitting process.  
B.  Spot Zoning and Conformity to the General Plan 
 
Legislative zoning or rezoning may be challenged as “spot zoning” when the 
action affects a small parcel or small number of landowners in either a positive or 
negative way. The challenge is based on the concern that the government is targeting 
a particular landowner or group of landowners for either favorable or adverse 
treatment, unrelated to the general welfare of the community as a whole.156 This 
                                                     
153 Id. at 539–44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring 
with the plurality that the Coal Act’s application to Eastern violates due process because of 
the retroactive imposition of financial liability, but dissenting from plurality’s conclusion 
that the statute violated the Takings Clause). 
154 See Adam J. McLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. 55, 
70–75 (2012) (discussing judicial scrutiny over individualized assessments). 
155 Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 71, at 287–89; see, e.g., Kanner, supra 
note 71, at 230 (discussing the Ehrlich decision and criticizing the view that Nollan and 
Dolan should not apply if the exaction is imposed by ordinance, rather than by an 
individualized decision, reasoning that “the constitutionality of an exaction would depend 
not on its legitimacy or its impact, but only on the identity of the municipal body demanding 
it”). 
156  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978) 
(discussing the spot zoning challenge to landmark laws, which apply only to selected parcels, 
but finding that “landmark laws are not like discriminatory, or ‘reverse spot,’ zoning: that is, 
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distinction between legislative and administrative action is difficult to apply to 
zoning because there is not always a strict separation of the legislative and 
administrative branches. A municipality’s city council may legislatively change a 
zoning law, but if it is tailored to specific parcels, it appears to be more 
administrative since such spot zoning looks more like the administratively granted 
zoning variance.157 
Requiring the local government to show that its zoning actions conform to, or 
are consistent with, the municipality’s general plan is another mechanism for 
controlling abuse. In takings litigation, the judiciary tends to defer to government 
planning efforts. Restrictions that are part of a comprehensive plan will generally 
not be found to be a regulatory taking.158 Professor Timothy Mulvaney points out 
that this tendency to favor planning reflects that “when the political branches act 
comprehensively, rather than in a targeted way toward a particular individual, it is 
far more likely that the ‘decision reflects a thoughtful, carefully considered 
assessment of all relevant costs and benefits.’”159 Planning typically takes place at a 
community level such that catering to individual interests may be reduced by 
developing area-wide goals that are based on the municipality as a whole. Because 
of the presumed neutrality of the planning process, the government can defend 
against an allegation of spot zoning by showing that the action taken conforms to 
the general plan, which is intended to benefit the community. A spot zoning 
challenge can also be framed as a substantive due process violation, alleging that the 
government has no rational basis under its police power authority to affect individual 
landowners, or as an equal protection violation, arguing that the government is not 
treating similarly situated individuals equally. 
States have adapted different approaches to resolving spot zoning challenges. 
For example, in California, rezoning is considered to be a quasi-legislative act, such 
that the government action is scrutinized under an “arbitrary or capricious or totally 
lacking in evidentiary support” standard of review,160  rather than requiring the 
substantial evidence necessary to support an adjudicative decision. In 2014, the 
California appellate court in Foothill Communities Coalition v. County of Orange,161 
stated that “[a] spot zone results when a small parcel of land is subject to more or 
less restrictive zoning than surrounding properties”162 and held that “the creation of 
an island of property with less restrictive zoning in the middle of properties with 
                                                     
a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less 
favorable treatment than the neighboring ones”).  
157 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 22. 
158 Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 530. 
159 Id. (quoting John D. Echeverria, The Triumph of Justice Stevens and the Principle 
of Generality, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 22, 24 (2006)). 
160 See Foothill Cmtys. Coal. v. Cty. of Orange, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Avenida San Juan P’ship v. City of San Clemente, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 570, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 635 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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more restrictive zoning is spot zoning.”163 The court first determined that the County 
Board of Supervisors’ (“the Board”) action to create new zoning for senior citizen 
housing on a single parcel of property owned by a local Diocese was spot zoning.164 
The court then concluded that this spot zoning was “in the public interest and . . . not 
arbitrary or capricious,”165 and that “the Board’s findings of consistency with the 
general plan and the North Tustin Specific Plan are supported by substantial 
evidence.”166 
A somewhat similar approach is taken in Arkansas, which considers rezoning 
to be a legislative act, subject to the arbitrary or capricious standard of judicial 
review. In PH, LLC v. City of Conway,167 a land developer was denied a rezoning 
request and the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the denial did not require de novo 
review because rezoning was a legislative action and only administrative and quasi-
judicial actions were entitled to de novo review under state statutory law.168 The 
court affirmed the lower court’s application of the standard for review of legislative 
acts that “[t]he court should affirm the city council’s decision unless it was arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable[,]” and affirmed the lower court findings, which 
included the finding that there was no reverse spot zoning or contract zoning at 
issue.169 Addressing the developer’s claim that the property was entitled to rezoning 
because it was “surrounded by parcels with different zoning designations,” the court 
found that there was no reverse spot zoning because the city’s decision was 
supported by legitimate traffic and safety concerns.170 In addition, the court declined 
to determine whether contract zoning is permitted in Arkansas because even if it was 
not allowed, there was no support for finding improper contract zoning in this 
situation “where a city council considered a different, more suitable, zone 
designation in determining whether to approve a petition to rezone.”171 Thus, in 
Arkansas, rezoning will typically be considered legislative and subject to deference 
by the courts. This view appears to be even more deferential than California’s quasi-
legislative classification. 
Likewise, spot zoning challenges in Pennsylvania require courts to “presume 
the zoning ordinance is valid and constitutional; the burden of proving otherwise is 
on the challenging party, who must show that the provisions are arbitrary and 
unreasonable, and have no relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare.”172 When analyzing a spot zoning challenge, the Pennsylvania courts have 
                                                     
163 Id. at 637. 164 Id. 
165 Id. at 641. 
166 Id. 167 344 S.W.3d 660 (Ark. 2009). 
168 Id. at 663, 666. 
169 Id. at 667. 170 Id. at 669 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978) (noting that “[r]everse spot zoning is ‘a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones’”)). 
171 Id. at 669–70. 
172 Penn St., L.P. v. E. Lampeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 84 A.3d 1114, 1121 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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determined that the most important factor “is whether the parcel in question is being 
treated unjustifiably different from similar surrounding land, thus creating an 
‘island’ having no relevant differences from its neighbors.”173 This seems to be 
similar to the approach generally used for equal protection and substantive due 
process claims against a challenged land-use decision, which gives a high level of 
deference to the government action. 
While states such as Arkansas, California, and Pennsylvania may subject spot 
zoning to a deferential standard of review as a legislative or quasi-legislative action, 
in many jurisdictions, a claim of spot zoning subjects the government action to 
increased judicial scrutiny, and courts generally look to balance the benefit to the 
community against the individualized impact on a landowner, either advantageous 
or detrimental. The size of the parcel, the number of landowners affected, and 
conformity with the general plan are important factors in determining whether 
judicial scrutiny is necessary to prevent the abuse of local power. For example, in 
New Jersey, a combination of factors may indicate that a land-use decision is either 
spot zoning or inverse spot zoning and constitutes an invalid arbitrary and capricious 
action.174 These factors can include the rezoning of a parcel that makes it more 
difficult for a landowner to develop; the rezoning was done at the insistence of 
neighboring landowners; the rezoning was originally designated for a different area 
and is not in compliance with the comprehensive plan; and the rezoning was done 
without hearing from expert planners of consultants.175 Examining these factors 
requires heightened scrutiny, and while New Jersey recognizes that “the role of 
courts in evaluating . . . [the adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance] is 
‘circumscribed,’” it also appreciates that the legislative power to zone cannot be 
exercised arbitrarily.176 
Some states have applied an established standard to review actions by local 
authorities that are challenged as illegal spot zoning. In North Carolina, for example, 
the fact finder must first determine if the zoning activity constitutes spot zoning.177 
Spot zoning is defined “as a zoning ordinance or amendment that ‘singles out and 
reclassifies a relatively small tract owned by a single person and surrounded by a 
much larger area uniformly zoned, so as to . . . relieve the small tract from 
restrictions to which the rest of the area is subjected.’” 178  If the zoning does 
constitute spot zoning, the court must decide whether “the zoning authority ma[de] 
a clear showing of a reasonable basis for the zoning.”179 To determine whether there 
                                                     
173 Id. 174 Riya Finnegan LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 962 A.2d 484, 492 (N.J. 2008). 
175 Id. 176 Id. at 489 (quoting Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren, 777 A.2d 334, 338 (2001)). 
177 See Etheridge v. Cty. of Currituck, 762 S.E.2d 289, 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Good Neighbors of S. Davidson v. Town of Denton, 559 S.E.2d 768, 771 (N.C. 2002)). 
178 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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was a reasonable basis for the government’s decision, the North Carolina courts 
consider the following factors (aka Chrismon factors): 
 
(1) “the size of the tract in question”; (2) “the compatibility of the disputed 
zoning action with an existing comprehensive zoning plan”; (3) “the 
benefits and detriments resulting from the zoning action for the owner of 
the newly zoned property, his neighbors, and the surrounding 
community”; and (4) “the relationship between the uses envisioned under 
the new zoning and the uses currently present in adjacent tracts.” 
Chrismon [v. Guilford Cty.] . . . 370 S.E.2d [579,] 589 [(N.C. 1988)]. With 
these factors in mind, “the criteria are flexible, and the specific analysis 
used depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”180 
 
This searching inquiry by North Carolina courts is far less deferential than that 
applied to local land-use decisions by California, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania courts 
and requires the government to “make a clear showing pursuant to any of the 
Chrismon factors that the rezoning was a reasonable spot zoning.”181 
Similar to North Carolina, South Carolina and Iowa courts evaluate spot zoning 
challenges by breaking the analysis into two parts.182 First, the court determines 
whether the action is spot zoning, and if it is, the court must decide whether the spot 
zoning is valid. In South Carolina, spot zoning is defined as “the ‘process of singling 
out a small parcel of land for use classification totally different from that of the 
surrounding area, for the benefit of owners of such property and to [the] detriment 
of other owners.’”183 In Iowa, the courts “consider the size of the spot zoned, the 
uses of the surrounding property, the changing conditions of the area, the use to 
which the subject property has been put and its suitability and adaptability for 
various uses,” but the most important factor is “whether the rezoned tract has a 
peculiar adaptability to the new classification as compared to the surrounding 
property.”184 For the second step, the courts in South Carolina inquire as to whether 
the “ordinance changes the zoning of a small area to a classification not consistent 
with the area,” which is invalid spot zoning, or whether the zoning ordinance merely 
expands an existing zoning classification, consistent with the city’s comprehensive 
                                                     
180 Id. at 292–93 (quoting Childress v. Yadkin Cty., 650 S.E.2d 55, 61 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007)). 
181 Id. at 295 (concluding that the spot zoning of 1.1 acres of agriculturally zoned land to heavy industrial zoning in order to accommodate a proposed recycling center was not a reasonable spot zoning). 
182 Historic Charleston Found. v. City of Charleston, 734 S.E.2d 306, 307 (S.C. 2012); Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384, 387–88 (Iowa 1994). 
183 Historic Charleston Found., 734 S.E.2d at 311 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (quoting Knowles v. City of Aiken, 407 S.E.2d 639, 641 (S.C. 1991)). 184 Little, 518 N.W.2d at 387–88; Kane v. City Council of Cedar Rapids, 537 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Iowa 1995) (finding that the council’s approval of a revised development plan was not illegal spot zoning). 
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plan.185 Iowa courts, on the other hand, have a three-part test for deciding whether 
the spot zoning is invalid.186 The courts must consider “(1) whether the new zoning 
is germane to an object within the police power, (2) whether there is a reasonable 
basis for making a distinction between the spot-zoned land and the surrounding 
property, and (3) whether the rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan.”187  
State differences in the standards used for judicial review of local government 
decision making are appropriate given that land-use regulation is local in nature, and 
that state views regarding the importance of municipality autonomy vary. For 
example, Maine courts also apply a heightened scrutiny test to determine whether 
spot zoning is illegal based upon whether the ordinance affects a single parcel for 
the benefit of a particular landowner and is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan 
or the character and zoning of the neighborhood in regards to the public health, 
safety, and welfare.188 Montana applies a three-part test to evaluate “whether: (1) 
‘the requested use is significantly different from the prevailing use in the area,’ (2) 
‘the area in which the requested use is to apply is rather small,’ and (3) ‘the requested 
change is more in the nature of special legislation.’”189 In Alaska, courts apply a 
similar three-part inquiry and consider “(1) the consistency of the amendment with 
the comprehensive plan; (2) the benefits and detriments of the amendment to the 
owners, adjacent landowners, and community; and (3) the size of the area 
‘rezoned.’”190 
Nebraska courts evaluate claims of spot zoning based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case, but will generally find that a zoning change is arbitrary 
and capricious and illegal spot zoning if “a small parcel of land is singled out for 
special and privileged treatment, the singling out is not in the public interest but 
serves only the interests of the landowner, and the action is not in accord with a 
comprehensive plan.”191 In Mississippi, the courts do not invalidate rezoning actions 
as spot zoning so long as the zoning is in harmony with the comprehensive plan.192 
                                                     
185 Historic Charleston Found., 734 S.E.2d 306, 313 (Hearn, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority should hold the City to “its own duly adopted plan”). 
186 Little, 518 N.W.2d at 388. 
187 Id. (concluding that the rezoning ordinance at issue was invalid spot zoning). 188 See City of Old Town v. Dimoulas, 803 A.2d 1018, 1024 (Me. 2002) (finding that the zoning ordinance adopted by voter referendum was not illegal spot zoning because the City was not able to show that the ordinance was inconsistent with the comprehensive plan). 189 Helena Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Lewis & Clark Cty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 290 P.3d 691, 699 (Mont. 2012) (citing Little v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 631 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Mont. 1981)) (finding there was no illegal spot zoning or reverse spot zoning because the zoning at issue was in compliance with the comprehensive plan and thus is not significantly different than the prevailing use in the area and is not in the nature of special legislation). 
190 Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1020, 1025 (Alaska 1996) (concluding that rezoning did not constitute spot zoning). 
191 Smith v. City of Papillion, 705 N.W.2d 584, 599 (Neb. 2005) (finding that “the Homeowners did not prove that this case involves illegal spot zoning”); see also Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 197 (Neb. 1989) (noting factors for invalid spot zoning and finding that developer did not “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the rezoning ordinance was illegal spot zoning”). 
192 Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So. 3d 25, 42 (Miss. 2010). 
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States applying heightened scrutiny to spot zoning challenges appear to do so 
because of the individualized nature of these actions. Giving deference to the 
government does not seem appropriate when the concern is that an individual 
landowner is singled out for either beneficial treatment or adverse discrimination 
through spot zoning or inverse spot zoning. Conformity or consistency with a 
comprehensive plan is an additional check on the government to make sure that land-
use decisions are being made for the good of the community and not for the benefit 
or detriment of an individual landowner. 
C.  Impermissible Delegation of Legislative Power 
 
Individualized government decisions may be more closely scrutinized when the 
legislature delegates decision-making powers to discrete local bodies such as a board 
of adjustment or historic preservation commission. If the standards for deciding 
whether an individual landowner is granted a right to develop are vague and subject 
to manipulation by administrative discretion, a court may deem the delegation of 
legislative power to be impermissible. This is a particular problem when aesthetic 
and cultural standards are administered by nonlegislative bodies against individual 
landowners. 
Again, because of the individualized nature of the decision-making, the danger 
of abuse exists when vaguely written guidelines leave room for discriminatory 
interpretation outside of the standard legislative process. This is yet another example 
where land-use principles guard against individualized decisions that are not applied 
generally to a larger group of landowners. Judicial scrutiny is increased when the 
legislative process allows for discretionary interpretations of regulatory standards 
that impact individual landowners.  
An example of this concern over inappropriate delegation of legislative power 
is found in A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh,193 where the North Carolina Supreme 
Court reviewed the state’s delegation of legislative power to municipalities for the 
purpose of establishing historic district regulation.194 The court observed that the 
“statutory authorization of historic district ordinances is . . . a mixture of delegated 
legislative and administrative power” because it requires a historic district 
commission to approve or disapprove applications for Certificates of 
Appropriateness before exterior changes can be made to historic architectural 
features. 195  This individualized determination has the potential for abuse of 
discretion by the Historic District Commission.196 However, the A-S-P court held 
that the combination of “architectural guidelines and design standards” and the 
ordinance’s limit on the commission’s discretion “to prevent[] only those of certain 
specified activities, ‘which would be incongruous with the historic aspects of the 
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196 Id. at 455 (noting that “procedural safeguards provided will serve as an additional check on potential abuse of the Historic District Commission’s discretion”). 
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district’” was sufficient to defeat a delegation challenge.197 More recently, a North 
Carolina appellate court in Meares v. Town of Beaufort 198  held that a design 
guideline used by the town’s historic preservation commission was more restrictive 
than the guideline allowed by state statute and was, therefore, unlawful as outside 
the authority delegated by the state.199  
Similar concerns about improper delegation of legislative power for historic 
preservation were voiced by the plaintiff in Lykes Bros., Inc. v. Architectural Review 
Commission (“ARC”). 200  Plaintiff alleged that the city’s ordinance “‘d[id] not 
provide sufficiently definite standards to guide action by the ARC or City Counsel 
to ensure that property owners subject to the decision-making process [were] 
protected from whimsical, capricious and otherwise arbitrary and discriminatory 
decisions . . . .’”201 The federal district court in Lykes Bros., Inc., rejected the facial 
challenge on the grounds of unlawful delegation of powers finding that the city’s 
ordinance governing historic and cultural preservation contained “sufficiently 
detailed standards to guide the exercise of administrative discretion.”202 
The allegation that a government body has improperly delegated legislative 
power is a call to more closely monitor situations where the decision-making power 
is shifted from a legislative body making general and uniform laws to another body 
that is making individualized decisions where the potential for discretionary abuse 
is intensified. 203  Given that historic regulation, landmark preservation, and 
architectural and aesthetic regulations may necessarily involve subjective decision-
making, courts have generally upheld such delegation when the deciding body is 
made up of individuals with expertise and the standards governing decision-making 
are not impermissibly vague or ambiguous.204 
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D.  Initiative and Referendum (“The People” Misbehaving?) 
 
Courts have at times prevented municipalities from establishing neighborhood 
zoning and consent requirements by holding that delegating zoning power to 
neighborhoods is unconstitutional.205 One of the early zoning ordinances enacted in 
Chicago to deal with the adverse impacts of livery stables in residential 
neighborhoods prohibited new stables unless nearby property owners gave written 
permission.206 This 1887 ordinance was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court, which 
reasoned that it was better to resolve these matters locally with those directly 
affected rather than with a central body.207 However, later U.S. Supreme Court cases 
cast doubt on this reasoning by 1) striking down, as an unconstitutional delegation 
of power, a zoning ordinance permitting property owners bordering a street to 
establish the building setback line;208 2) upholding a zoning ordinance prohibiting 
billboards unless a majority of local property owners consented; 209  and 3) 
invalidating a zoning ordinance prohibiting group homes unless a majority of 
homeowners near the location consented.210 
The major concern expressed by the Court in this line of cases is that giving 
individual landowners control over their neighbors’ land use promotes self-
interested behavior and may constitute an improper delegation of legislative 
authority that is subject to arbitrary and abusive land regulation.211 While these 
decisions are difficult to reconcile,212 they illustrate the judicial skepticism toward 
exercising land-use power on an individualized basis, which tends to place self-
interest over the public good. The more localized the power, the more likely it is to 
be abused.213 This concern about the abuse of localized power is also evident in 
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challenges to initiatives and referenda actions based on allowing “the people” to 
exercise legislative or adjudicative action directly through the ballot box. 
An initiative is distinguished from a referendum based on the nature of the 
action. When “the people” are exercising their power to initiate regulation on a 
proactive basis, they are deemed to be acting in a legislative capacity. However, the 
referendum is reactive in nature and is typically used to affirm or rescind regulatory 
acts of a legislative body. A majority of states do not allow zoning by initiative, but 
states are about evenly split as to whether legislative zoning acts should be subject 
to the referendum process. 
The initiative process generates procedural due process concerns because there 
is no notice or hearing other than the political process, but the referendum process 
presents less of a concern since it is preceded by legislative zoning action that 
provides due process through open hearings. Another concern with this direct 
democracy is that the voters may not be required to follow the comprehensive 
planning document for the municipality and using an initiative or referendum will 
result in “piecemeal” zoning that is not necessarily in the best interests of the entire 
community. Finally, the use of initiatives may avoid the environmental impact 
reviews that would otherwise be required of local legislatures.214 
The Supreme Court sanctioned the use of the referendum process to approve or 
reject zoning by the city council in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 
Inc..215 The developer challenged the city’s delegation of legislative power to the 
people, but the Court held that the Ohio constitution expressly reserved the 
legislative authority of the people and was, therefore, not subject to a charge of 
“standardless” delegation.216 The Court distinguished its earlier decisions in Eubank 
and Roberge on the basis that neither of those cases involved a referendum by the 
people.217 Instead, Eubank and Roberge involved “the standardless delegation of 
power to a limited group of property owners . . . not to be equated with 
decisionmaking by the people through the referendum process.” 218  The dissent 
expressed concern about the possibility of spot zoning because the rezoning at issue 
involved a small lot and did not allow the landowner an opportunity to be heard by 
the voters.219 
This concern about the potential for unfair individualized decision-making is 
the same administrative versus legislative distinction that the Court refused to 
recognize in City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope 
Foundation. 220  In Cuyahoga Falls, the Court upheld the voters’ referendum to 
invalidate a specific site plan that had been approved for a low-income housing 
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project and affirmed its view that administrative land-use actions taken through the 
referendum process do not violate due process.221 Harkening back to its earlier 
decision in Eastlake, the Court rejected the Ohio Supreme Court’s distinction 
between legislative and administrative referendums in Cuyahoga Falls and affirmed 
that subjecting either type of ordinance to the referendum process is not an unlawful 
delegation of power, but is instead the people’s retained power to govern.222 It 
should be noted that voter actions, while not necessarily considered impermissible 
delegation, are still subject to other constitutional challenges such as substantive due 
process or equal protection violations.223 
While the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit voters from acting on 
administrative land-use decisions, states continue to control the use of the initiative 
and referendum through constitutional and statutory provisions. States generally 
prohibit delegating administrative or adjudicative decisions to voters because of due 
process concerns, but may statutorily allow legislative actions to be exercised by 
voters through initiative or referendum. In California, for example, the state 
constitution provides that voters have the right to use the initiative and referendum 
powers, but that “a referendum may be used to review only legislative acts and not 
executive or administrative acts of a local government.”224 In Worthington v. City 
Council of Rohnert Park, a California court reviewed the city’s action to establish a 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with a local Indian tribe addressing the 
potential impacts of a casino project and determined that it was an administrative 
action, not subject to referendum.225 Although the city’s action could be considered 
a policy decision, voters in California are limited to adopting or rejecting statutes, 
and the city’s negotiation with an Indian tribe is a contract, not a law, therefore it is 
not legislation subject to referendum. 226  South Dakota also restricts the use of 
referenda on administrative actions. In Schafer v. Deuel County Board of 
Commissioners,227 initiative petitions were filed to amend certain zoning ordinances 
so that the special exceptions provision requiring quasi-judicial review by 
administrative boards would be treated as legislative action such that the voters 
would have a right of referendum.228 The South Dakota Supreme Court refused to 
allow the use of the initiative process to “define decisions that are quasi-judicial 
administrative as legislative and thereby subject to referendum.”229  
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Most states, based on the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, state legislation, or 
judicial decision, require that zoning be either “in accordance with” or “consistent 
with” a comprehensive plan, if one exists.230 In Hawaii, the Supreme Court has held 
that zoning, while legislative, is not permitted through the initiative process because 
it is inconsistent with the need for long-range planning.231 Similarly, the Washington 
Supreme Court in 1000 Friends of Washington v. McFarland232 held that county 
ordinances enacted to implement the Growth Management Act (“GMA”) were not 
subject to local referenda.233 While recognizing “the vital importance of the rights 
of local citizens to participate in policy decisions affecting their communities,”234 
the court affirmed the state legislature’s exercise of power to mandate that counties 
develop comprehensive land-use plans that are not subject to local referenda.235  
Even if the state does not statutorily allow administrative or adjudicative types 
of decisions to be referred to the people, some state constitutions, as noted by the 
Court in Cuyahoga Falls may still reserve power in the people to exercise regulatory 
power in all instances.236 For example, under a Utah statute, only legislative actions 
are subject to referendum, and “site-specific rezoning decisions are statutorily 
ineligible for referendum.” 237  Thus, the distinction between legislative and 
administrative power is a decisive factor in determining whether voters in Utah can 
demand a vote on local laws. However, the Utah Supreme Court in Krejci v. City of 
Saratoga Springs held that “the people’s power to legislate is not a creature of 
statute” and that the statutory provision did not override the authority of the people 
as reserved in Utah’s Constitution.238 The court then found that the site-specific 
rezoning at issue, which rezoned twelve acres of property owned by one landowner 
from a low density to a medium density residential zone, was a legislative action 
subject to referendum based on the state constitution.239 While it appears that the 
state statute was attempting to exclude administrative type of actions, such as site-
specific rezoning, from referendum authority, the court determined that “[t]he chief 
hallmarks of legislative action . . . the adoption of rules of general applicability and 
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the ‘weighing of broad, competing policy considerations’” had been met by site-
specific zoning.240 
State constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions differ as to whether the 
police power delegated by the state to municipalities and counties can be shared by 
the people through the use of initiative and referendum. In some states, the power is 
considered to be reserved for the people even while it has also been delegated to 
local entities. The distinction between legislative action and administrative action is 
important in those states that limit the initiative and referendum process to legislative 
action only. Even in states that allow initiatives and referenda to be used for 
legislative action, the process may be restricted when necessary to conform or be 
consistent with comprehensive planning. These distinctions, controls, and 
restrictions expressed through this patchwork of state statutes and judicial decisions 
are intended to control abuse of the land-use planning process by limiting 
individualized actions of self-interested local citizens through piecemeal, ballot-box 
zoning. 
E.  Eminent Domain 
 
The government’s use of the eminent domain power, which allows 
condemnation of property for public use so long as just compensation is paid, is 
inevitably an individualized land-use action because it involves the valuation and 
transfer of individual parcels of land. Nonetheless, judicial scrutiny of eminent 
domain actions has remained deferential, with courts asking only whether the 
government is taking the property for “public use” and whether the landowner is 
receiving “just compensation,” according to Fifth Amendment constraints. One of 
the reasons supporting this deference is that government planning efforts have 
precipitated the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment purposes.241 In 
both Berman v. Parker 242  and Kelo v. City of New London, 243  economic 
redevelopment was found to constitute a “public use” that satisfied the requirement 
for the exercise of eminent domain.244 Integrated planning for the redevelopment of 
swaths of blighted property played a significant role in both cases as the Court relied 
on the comprehensive planning process to find that use of eminent domain was 
constitutional.245 
In the Kelo case, Suzette Kelo’s property was taken by the local municipality 
for purposes of land assembly for redevelopment, even though a local Italian club 
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was spared from condemnation, and a nonblighted neighborhood was demolished 
without ever being replaced by the originally proposed private development.246 A 
group of law professors submitted an amicus brief in the Kelo v. City of New London 
case, arguing that the use of eminent domain should require a higher level of judicial 
scrutiny, similar to the scrutiny applied to land-use exactions under the 
Nollan/Dolan standard.247 However, the Court in Kelo followed precedent from the 
Berman and Midkiff decisions to find that so long as the government had any rational 
basis for exercising its eminent domain power to achieve any conceivable public 
purpose, the means to obtain the ends would not be subject to judicial scrutiny.248 
While Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, agreed that eminent domain did 
not require heightened scrutiny, he did “not foreclose the possibility that a more 
stringent standard of review . . . might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn 
category of takings.”249 
Since Kelo, some state courts have relied upon the existence of a 
comprehensive planning process, or the lack thereof, to determine the level of 
judicial scrutiny applied to eminent domain action challenges.250 A lack of planning 
may be considered “a constitutional red flag”251 that compels courts to more closely 
scrutinize individualized condemnation actions. However, unlike other land-use 
regulation and decision-making that affects individual landowners, eminent domain 
actions do not generally trigger increased judicial scrutiny to prevent governmental 
abuse. The Court has chosen not to require heightened scrutiny in eminent domain 
actions, particularly if they are the result of comprehensive planning, even though it 
requires Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to be applied to land-use exactions.252 Perhaps the 
level of judicial scrutiny should depend upon the presence of comprehensive 
planning, similar to the deference given to spot zoning when it is in conformance to 
a comprehensive plan. This would allow both state and federal courts to provide 
more stringent review of those eminent domain actions that appear to unfairly target 
individual landowners without the support of a community-wide plan that provides 
for shared burdens.253 
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F.  Constitutional Challenges to Land-Use Regulation 
 
The level of scrutiny applied to judicial review of constitutional challenges to 
land-use actions is also at times dependent upon whether the challenged action is 
legislative or administrative in nature. For example, “facial” challenges are typically 
asserted against legislation that is unconstitutional as applied to everyone, while “as 
applied” challenges are asserted to challenge legislative action as it affects an 
individual landowner. In the Ninth Circuit, facial challenges applying Nollan and 
Dolan are prohibited because the fact-specific inquiry into whether an exaction 
meets the test of having a nexus to the impact on the land and being roughly 
proportional to the impact requires that the court have some action upon which to 
base its analysis.254 In Koontz Coalition v. City of Seattle, the district court reviewed 
a land-use challenge asserted by a group of downtown Seattle property owners 
against an ordinance implementing a “downtown bonus program.”255 The ordinance 
allowed a developer who wished to exceed the allowed building density to either 
provide affordable housing or pay a “fee in-lieu” of the housing.256 This bonus 
incentive program did not require developers to provide affordable housing or pay 
the in-lieu fees unless they wanted to exceed the established zoning regulations.257 
The court held that the property owners’ two Nollan/Dolan claims were not ready 
for adjudication because the facial challenge was prudentially unripe under Ninth 
Circuit jurisprudence and the future as-applied challenges were speculative and 
uncertain.258 
Substantive due process and equal protection challenges do not usually 
distinguish between generalized legislation and individualized action as the claims 
involve an assertion by the landowner that they have been treated unfairly or 
differently than similarly situated landowners would be treated. State judicial 
scrutiny standards for these challenges vary between a searching review, which 
balances the hardships to the landowners against the benefits to the community,259 
and a deferential review, which supports a government action if it is fairly debatable 
that there is any basis for exercise of the police power. 260  Federal courts are 
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142 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
deferential to state and local government and apply a “shocks the conscience” 
standard before they will invalidate legislation or an action based on substantive due 
process and, perhaps, equal protection claims.261 Procedural due process challenges 
are usually not applicable to legislative action, based on the public notice and 
hearing requirements for the legislative process. However, administrative actions 
require notice and hearing for the specific individual affected and procedural due 
process challenges can be raised. 
Land-use regulations that burden a fundamental constitutional right may be 
subject to heightened scrutiny, not only because they burden property, but because 
they burden a protected constitutional right.262 First Amendment challenges to land-
use regulation are typically advanced by adult businesses and religious 
institutions.263 Adult businesses claiming that regulating the operations of adult 
bookstores, movie theaters, and nude dancing has restricted free speech will receive 
strict judicial scrutiny when the restriction is content based rather than content 
neutral.264 In order for the court to apply a “strict scrutiny” standard to the regulation, 
the adult business must show that its speech is being restricted because of its adult 
content. Although local legislation has targeted adult movie theaters because of the 
content of the films being shown, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied an 
“intermediate scrutiny” review standard to adult business challenges based on the 
concept of “secondary effects.” 265  The Court has decided that if the adverse 
secondary effects of the adult business, such as increased crime, prostitution, and 
other public nuisances, are the target of such local action, not the content of the 
speech, judicial review will be based on the less-searching “content-neutral” 
standard, rather than the “strict scrutiny” standard.266 
The Court’s free speech framework for analyzing challenges against adult 
businesses was recently employed by the First Circuit in Showtime Entertainment, 
LLC v. Town of Mendon267 to review zoning restrictions on adult entertainment 
businesses in Mendon, Massachusetts. The court found that the bylaws regulating 
the size and height of adult business facilities, as well as the operating hours, which 
were not applied to other similar businesses, “unconstitutionally infringe[d] on 
Showtime’s right to engage in a protected expressive activity.”268 In deciding the 
appropriate level of judicial review to apply to these restrictions, the Showtime court 
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discussed the content-based restriction, which requires the government to prove a 
compelling state interest using least restrictive means to achieve that interest, and 
the content-neutral restriction, which incidentally burdens speech and requires there 
to be a significant government interest that does not burden more speech than 
necessary and leaves open alternative channels of communication.269 However, the 
court also recognized that the zoning regulation will be treated as content neutral 
“only if the differential treatment does not stem from a disapproval of the former 
business-type’s expression.”270 The Showtime court found that Mendon’s zoning 
bylaws were underinclusive because they were not applied to other commercial 
businesses with similar traffic safety and rural aesthetic secondary effects. 271 
Therefore, Mendon did not prove that “it ha[d] a substantial interest in regulating 
the secondary effects of adult-entertainment businesses that [was] actually furthered 
by its bylaws.”272 
Government restrictions on religious exercise may occur in the land-use context 
when local officials impose regulations on religious institutions to address concerns 
such as traffic, parking, noise, congestion, and other impacts on residential 
neighborhoods. In order to evaluate the constitutionality of such government 
restrictions on religious exercise, both the legislative branch and judicial branch of 
the federal government have been involved in establishing the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny over such actions. In Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,273 two workers were denied unemployment benefits 
when they were discharged from their jobs as drug counselors for smoking peyote 
as part of a religious ceremony.274 The Supreme Court stated that it has “consistently 
held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”275 Therefore, neutral laws of general application that happen to impact 
religious freedom should be analyzed under a rational basis test that is highly 
deferential to the government. The Court in Smith distinguished some of its earlier 
decisions, which had applied a higher level of judicial scrutiny to free exercise 
challenges, based on the Sherbert test, which “was developed in a context that lent 
itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant 
conduct.”276 The Smith decision was subsequently revisited by statute,277 but has 
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been cited to support heightened scrutiny of individualized actions infringing 
religious freedom as opposed to generally applicable laws.278 Thus, we see once 
more that individualized actions may be subject to increased scrutiny under the First 
Amendment, even though generally applicable legislation burdening religious 
exercise may be subject only to rational basis review in circumstances where the 
Smith decision is still applicable.279  
The Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. applied the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) to regulations imposing health-
insurance coverage for contraceptive methods that violate the religious beliefs of 
owners of closely held corporations and held that the regulations violated RFRA.280 
The Court described the history of its pre-Smith decisions, the Smith decision, and 
the two federal statutes enacted following the Smith decision that have attempted to 
provide protection for religious liberty.281 The Hobby Lobby Court explained that 
following the Smith decision, Congress enacted RFRA to “restore the compelling 
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder. . . and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened.”282 RFRA was designed to overrule the Smith decision and restore the law 
as established by the pre-Smith decisions.283 Originally applied to both the federal 
government and to the states, the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores,284 held that 
RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states because Congress overstepped 
its Section 5 authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the First 
Amendment. 285  Congress responded by enacting the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), which “imposes the same 
general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental actions.”286 
The Hobby Lobby Court noted that, relevant for purposes of deciding this health care 
regulation case, RLUIPA amended RFRA’s definition of “exercise of religion” to 
separate it from First Amendment case law and to mandate that the concept “be 
construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise.”287 
RLUIPA has been applied to land-use regulation at the state level, although the 
Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson288 upheld its constitutionality only in regards to its 
                                                     
278 See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015) (noting that Smith “held that 
neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden the exercise of religions usually do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment”) (emphasis added)). 
279 See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 (noting that after its decision in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997), RFRA as applied to the states, was no longer valid). 
280 Id. at 2759. 
281 Id. at 2760–62. 282 Id. at 2791 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)). 
283 Id. 
284 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 285 Id. at 533–34 (holding that “[t]he stringent test RFRA demands . . . far exceed[ed] any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith”). 
286 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
287 Id. at 2761–62. 
288 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
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application to institutionalized persons. 289  Most lower courts reviewing 
constitutional challenges to the land-use portion of the Act have upheld RLUIPA’s 
constitutionality as applied to land-use regulation and religious exercise.290 The 
important thing about RLUIPA for purposes of this Article is that RLUIPA is not 
typically triggered by a neutral and generally applicable zoning law, but instead 
applies when the government is involved in making “individualized assessments of 
the proposed uses for the property involved.”291 The RLUIPA substantial burden 
provision provides that the government cannot impose a land-use regulation that 
substantially burdens religious exercise unless it shows that it furthers a compelling 
government interest by the least restrictive means. 292  Decisions applying this 
substantial burden provision have recognized that it addresses “‘subtle forms of 
discrimination’ by land use authorities that may occur when ‘a state delegates 
essentially standardless discretion to nonprofessionals operating without procedural 
safeguards.’”293 
RLUIPA’s focus on individualized actions that present the opportunity for 
arbitrary and discriminatory response by local officials was addressed by the Second 
Circuit in Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District 
Commission. 294  In Chabad Lubavitch, Chabad purchased property in a historic 
district for purposes of expanding the existing building to accommodate its religious 
mission. 295  Chabad applied to the Historic District Commission (“HDC”) for 
permission to modify the property and was denied. 296  The court found that 
Connecticut’s statutory scheme for historic properties regulation requires an 
individual assessment of any application to modify such properties and also 
“requires that local commissions implement that general rule by applying loosely 
defined and subjective standards to discrete applications.”297 The denial of Chabad’s 
application to the HDC was determined to be an individualized assessment that 
triggered RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision.298 In remanding the claim to the 
district court, the Second Circuit instructed the court to consider:  
 
[W]hether the conditions attendant to the HDC’s denial of the Chabad’s 
application themselves imposed a substantial burden on the Chabad’s 
religious exercise, whether feasible alternatives existed for the Chabad to 
exercise its faith, and whether the Chabad reasonably believed it would be 
                                                     
289 Id. at 713. 
290 Id. at 717–18. 
291 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2012). 292 Id. at §§ 2000cc(a)(1)(A), (B). 
293 Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
294 Chabad, 768 F.3d at 195. 
295 Id. at 187. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 193–94. 
298 Id. at 194–95. 
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permitted to undertake its proposed modifications when it purchased the 
property . . . .299 
 
In addition to requiring heightened scrutiny of individualized actions interfering 
with religious exercise, RLUIPA also provides for equal terms claims, which 
address unequal, but not different treatment of land-use, 300  and discrimination 
claims, which require evidence of discriminatory intent.301 
 
III.  ADDRESSING THE KOONTZ CONTROVERSY 
 
This Part addresses the takings issue evoked by in-lieu monetary exactions. The 
Court in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District submitted such fees 
to the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test. However, the holding left the 
unanswered question of how broadly this heightened scrutiny should be applied to 
other monetary obligations imposed by the government. Lower courts have applied 
varying levels of scrutiny to impact fees, and this Part addresses the multiplicity of 
views among the states. 
A.  Background 
 
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 302  a landowner 
seeking to develop a tract of land near Orlando, Florida, was denied permission to 
build when he refused to comply with the water district’s mitigation demand to pay 
for improvements on land owned by the water district that was located several miles 
away in order to offset the environmental impact of his proposed development.303 
The water district required this in-lieu exaction, in addition to the physical exaction 
requiring the landowner to deed an eleven-acre conservation easement to mitigate 
construction on wetlands.304 The landowner sued the water district for monetary 
damages, claiming that the excessive mitigation demands constituted a taking 
without just compensation.305 
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision that was in favor 
of the landowner, holding that the Nollan/Dolan exactions test should not be applied 
to the offsite mitigation proposed by the water district, which did not require Koontz 
to dedicate real property and that “because St. Johns did not issue permits, Mr. 
Koontz never expended any funds towards the performance of offsite mitigation, 
and nothing was ever taken from Mr. Koontz.” 306 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 
                                                     
299 Id. at 196. 
300 Id. at 196–97. 
301 Id. at 198. 302 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
303 Id. at 2593. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011), 
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (emphasis in original). 
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finding that under the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine governmental demands 
that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the impacts of a proposed 
development are subject to a takings claim for just compensation regardless of 
whether the permit is approved on the condition that the landowner meets the 
demands or whether the permit is denied because the landowner refuses. 307  In 
addition, the Court held that monetary exactions “must satisfy the nexus and rough 
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”308 One of the questions that 
remains after the Koontz decision is how far does this scrutiny of land-use 
determinations extend?309 
Justice Alito, in delivering the opinion of the Court, which held that monetary 
exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, noted that its decisions in these cases 
“reflect two realities of the permitting process.” 310  The first reality is that the 
government “has broad discretion to deny a permit” and coerce a land-use applicant 
into giving up property in response to an extortionate demand so long as “the 
building permit is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope 
to receive.” 311  Such abuse is prohibited by the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.312 The second reality is that new development may impose costs on the 
public that should be internalized by landowners, but the government “may not 
leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack 
an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”313 Applying Nollan 
and Dolan to these two permitting realities allows the government “to insist that 
applicants bear the full costs of their proposals while still forbidding the government 
from engaging in ‘out-and-out . . . extortion.’” 314  Extending this precedent to 
monetary exactions, which serve the same function as physical exactions, will 
preclude the government from evading the Nollan and Dolan restrictions by giving 
the landowner “a choice of either surrendering an easement or making a payment 
equal to the easement’s value.”315 
The Koontz majority rejected the government’s argument that based on the 
concurrence and dissent in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 316  a demand that the 
landowner spend money to improve public land does not constitute a taking so long 
as the financial obligation does not “‘operate upon or alter an identified property 
                                                     
307 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595. 
308 Id. at 2599. 
309 See generally Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 20, at 289–90 (considering how far the scrutiny of land-use determination extends after Koontz as well as alternatives that would attempt to “reconcile the Court’s twin interests in restraining governmental power over property owners and in keeping the gears of ordinary land use regulation running in ways that protect the property interests of those owners”). 
310 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
311 Id. at 2594–95. 
312 Id. at 2595. 
313 Id. 
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315 Id. at 2599. 
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interest.’”317 This appears to be the major stumbling block for reconciling Justice 
Alito’s opinion with Justice Kagan’s dissent, which maintained that “requiring a 
person to pay money to the government, or spend money on its behalf” was not a 
taking based on the Court’s decision in Eastern Enterprises because requiring 
someone to pay money to repair public wetlands “does not affect a ‘specific and 
identified propert[y] or property right[]’; it simply ‘imposes an obligation to perform 
an act’ (the improvement of wetlands) that costs money.”318 Justice Alito asserted 
that the “fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link between the government’s 
demand and a specific parcel of real property,”319 while Justice Kagan equated the 
government’s requirement that Koontz pay money to restore public wetlands in 
exchange for a permit to “‘an ordinary liability to pay money,’” which would not be 
a taking according to the majority of Justices in Eastern Enterprises.320 The two 
opinions could be reconciled by applying the Koontz majority opinion to monetary 
exactions that are imposed as part of a permitting process, with the associated 
concerns about broad government discretion and extortion, and applying the 
dissent’s reasoning to financial obligations that are legislatively established in the 
form of impact fee schedules and, therefore, unrelated to a specific identified 
property interest. 
On remand, the Florida District Court of Appeal addressed the case for the fifth 
time in St. Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz,321 and found that its 
decision in Koontz IV “is entirely consistent with the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court” and reaffirmed its earlier decision in its entirety without allowing 
the briefing to be reopened.322 The dissent objected to the majority’s decision to 
affirm the judgment without further review, noting that the Supreme Court in Koontz 
held that “the District did not commit a ‘taking without just compensation,’”323 and 
thus the Florida court’s affirmation of Koontz IV on the basis of a takings claim is 
incorrect because the remand was for the purposes of determining whether Koontz 
has a damages remedy (other than a takings remedy) under Florida law.324  
B.  In-Lieu Exactions and Nollan/Dolan 
 
Turning now to the Koontz Court’s holding that monetary in-lieu exactions are 
subject to the Nollan/Dolan test, this Article agrees with the Court’s holding, but 
submits that impact fees imposed based on legislatively determined fee schedules 
do not constitute monetary exactions. The differing level of scrutiny for legislative 
                                                     
317 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599. 
318 Id. at 2605–06 (quoting E. Enter.’s, 524 U.S. at 540–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)). 
319 Id. at 2600. 
320 Id. at 2605 (citing E. Enter.’s, 524 U.S. at 554–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
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actions (rational basis with no record needed to support reasoning) as opposed to 
administrative actions (substantial evidence required) is just one illustration of the 
land-use framework that requires individualized governmental decision making to 
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny. Justice Arabian’s opinion in the 
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City325 decision is helpful in this regard. In Ehrlich, the 
landowner challenged both a monetary exaction to mitigate the loss of commercial 
recreational use and an “art in public places” impact fee.326 The court distinguished 
between a monetary exaction (held in Ehrlich to be subject to Nollan/Dolan) and an 
impact fee.327 
 
Nevertheless, we agree with the city that the art in public places fee 
is not a development exaction of the kind subject to the Nollan-Dolan 
takings analysis. As both the trial court and the Court of Appeal concluded, 
the requirement to provide either art or a cash equivalent thereof is more 
akin to traditional land use regulations imposing minimal building 
setbacks, parking and lighting conditions, landscaping requirements, and 
other design conditions such as color schemes, building materials and 
architectural amenities. Such aesthetic conditions have long been held to 
be valid exercises of the city’s traditional police power, and do not amount 
to a taking merely because they might incidentally restrict a use, diminish 
the value, or impose a cost in connection with the property. (See, e.g., 
Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 fn.13, 101 S.Ct 2882, 
2892 fn. 13, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 [approving prohibition against outdoor 
advertising]; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 98 S.Ct. 2646 [upholding municipal power to preserve landmark 
structures]; Agins v. City of Tiburon, [] 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138 
[upholding condition to preserve scenic views].) The requirement of 
providing art in an area of the project reasonably accessible to the public 
is, like other design and landscaping requirements, a kind of aesthetic 
control well within the authority of the city to impose.328 
 
Exactions, either physical or monetary in lieu, should be subjected to 
Nollan/Dolan if they are government conditions targeted to a specific property as 
part of the permitting process.329 This could potentially include legislative impact 
fees, but only if it can be shown that a specific property or landowner was targeted 
by the legislative action. In such a case, this Article proposes that courts reviewing 
                                                     
325 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). 
326 Id. at 434–35. 
327 Id.; but see Kanner, supra note 71, at 232 (criticizing California Supreme Court’s affirmance of the public art fee on the basis that it was not even rationally related to “traditional land-use regulations” and violated the developer’s First Amendment speech rights). 
328 Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 450 (alterations in original). 
329  See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 40 (noting that the Supreme Court is generally reluctant to review local regulation, but in the exaction cases it “has gotten down and dirty with site-specific activity”). 
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a landowner’s challenge to a legislatively targeted impact fee use the same concepts 
applied in spot zoning cases to ferret out government abuse. Spot zoning challenges 
seek a higher level of judicial scrutiny for the legislative act of zoning, as discussed 
in Part II.B. above. Factors such as the size of the parcel, the number of landowners 
affected, and conformity with the general plan are considered in deciding whether 
the zoning is an abuse of power. If examining these same factors in challenges to 
impact fees indicates the potential for abuse, Nollan/Dolan judicial scrutiny of a 
legislative impact fee would be warranted to prevent the abuse of local power. If 
instead the fee has been legislatively determined and appears to be based upon an 
analysis of general development impacts, then the concern about either favoritism 
or unfairness should not be as strong. The remainder of this Article assumes that 
legislative impact fees are not targeted to individual landowners and should not be 
subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny unless they appear to be abusive, similar to a charge 
of illegal spot zoning.  
Individualized government mitigation conditions with the potential to unfairly 
affect a specific landowner should be analyzed under Nollan/Dolan, whether they 
are physical or monetary, whereas impact fees that are applied to all similarly 
situated landowners, based upon previous legislative determinations, should be 
subject to a dual rational nexus test or other state review standards, depending on 
the state’s law.330 Many state courts, including those in Florida, do apply more than 
deferential scrutiny to legislative fees using the dual rational nexus test to make sure 
they are related to the impact of a particular type of development and are not being 
used in lieu of assessing a tax.331 Impact fees that fail a dual rational nexus test (or 
some other state-determined scrutiny) may be considered an invalid tax. Since local 
governments may not have the authority to impose taxes under certain 
circumstances, impact fees that are not rationally related to the adverse impact 
caused by the development may be viewed as revenue raising and presumed to be a 
tax. Given that an overarching concern in land use is that local government power 
must be constrained because it is subject to abuse, a majority of states have 
appropriately distinguished individualized exactions from legislatively imposed 
impact fees.332 
  
                                                     
330 See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 40 (observing that negotiations between developers 
and municipalities provide mutually beneficial gains from such trades). 
331 See Koontz v. St. Johns Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2602 (2013) (noting 
that “state law normally provides an independent check on excessive land use permitting 
fees”). 
332 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2602–03 (rejecting the contention that Nollan and Dolan 
are not needed to protect land-use permit applicants and finding that other constitutional 
doctrines are not sufficient because of “the special vulnerability of land use permit applicants 
to extortionate demands for money”). 
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C.  Impact Fees and the Dual Rational Nexus Test 
 
Local governments have used exactions in some form for more than a century, 
beginning with physical exactions that were demanded within a proposed land 
development project.333 After World War II, municipalities began asking for “in lieu 
of” cash payments instead of land dedication.334 These monetary exactions were the 
precursor to impact fees, which are now used to finance community infrastructure 
improvements that are required to support the growth generated by land 
development. In holding that in-lieu exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, 
the Koontz majority pointed out that land-use officials should not be allowed to avoid 
scrutiny by giving the landowner “a choice of either surrendering an easement or 
making a payment equal to the easement’s value.”335 Justice Alito noted that “[s]uch 
so-called ‘in lieu of’ fees are utterly commonplace . . . and they are functionally 
equivalent to other types of land use exactions.”336 Justice Alito cited a law review 
article as support for this information, but did not discuss the article’s analysis of the 
difference between impact fees, exactions, and how states have applied 
Nollan/Dolan to exactions, but have applied state standards to impact fees. 337 
Professor Rosenberg’s comprehensive article, The Changing Culture of American 
Land Use: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, notes that “the Nollan/Dolan 
principles did not override and dominate a well-developed body of state statutory 
and constitutional law, and federal litigation did not become the crucible for 
determining the legality of impact fee practices.”338 
A majority of states have historically applied some version of a dual rational 
nexus test to evaluate impact fees and verify their validity. 339  This test was 
developed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee 
Falls, 340  which challenged the validity of an ordinance imposing a set fee per 
developed lot, in lieu of dedicating land.341 The test was later adopted by other 
                                                     
333 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 183. 
334 Id. at 201–02. 
335 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599. 
336 Id. (citing Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 202–03). 
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339 Id. at 226; see, e.g., St. Johns Cnty. v. Ne. Fla. Builders Ass’n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 
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jurisdictions and has been described with two steps: 1) there must be a rational nexus 
“‘between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population 
generated by the subdivision’” and 2) a rational nexus “‘between the expenditures 
of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.’”342 Scrutiny is 
applied to determine whether the fee is being used as a general revenue-raising 
regulation and should be classified as a tax. An impact fee that fails the dual rational 
nexus test because it appears to be general revenue-raising legislation, not 
reasonably related to the adverse impacts created by the development, may be treated 
as a tax.343 The tax may then be invalidated if the local government does not have 
the power to tax or if the imposition of new taxes requires approval by a super 
majority of voters.344 
Other states have applied differing levels of scrutiny to impact fees. For 
example, in Homebuilders Ass’n of Metropolitan Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park & 
Recreation District,345 an Oregon appellate court noted that under Oregon law, a 
legislatively imposed exaction of money that is applicable generally to a large 
number of people cannot be challenged as a taking.346  Developers in this case 
challenged a system development charge (“SDC”) that charged fees to new 
developments for funding parks and recreation facilities.347 The court concluded, as 
it had done in an earlier case involving traffic impact fees, that the Nollan/Dolan test 
does not apply to legislatively imposed fees calculated by a formula based on the 
impact that the development will have on infrastructure. 348  Instead, the court 
reviewed various federal and state decisions involving legislative fees and noted that 
some jurisdictions applied a “reasonable relationship” test that is “only slightly more 
rigorous than the ‘rational basis’ test.”349 The court declined to decide between these 
two tests as it concluded that the SDC would easily pass either test.350 
Similar to Oregon courts, Arizona courts declined to apply the Nollan/Dolan 
test to impact fees. In Home Builders Ass’n of Central Arizona v. City of 
Scottsdale,351 the Arizona Supreme Court examined cases that applied the “dual 
nexus test” to uphold development fees imposed to finance public improvements 
                                                     
342 Id. at 226 (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 606, 611–12 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the second prong of the test will not be satisfied unless “the 
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2002), cert. denied, 52 P.3d 1057 (Or. 2002)). 
349 Id. at 410. 
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that would be needed in the foreseeable, albeit not immediate, future.352 In resolving 
a challenge by developers to a water resources development fee, the court declined 
to apply the Nollan/Dolan test because Dolan “involved a city’s adjudicative 
decision to impose a condition tailored to the particular circumstances of an 
individual case . . . [while] the Scottsdale case involve[d] a generally applicable 
legislative decision by the city.”353 Because the court observed that nothing in its 
opinions required it “to plunge into the thicket of the levels of scrutiny in this 
case,”354 the court equated the Dolan standard of rough proportionality with the 
Arizona statutory requirement that the fee “bear a reasonable relationship ‘to the 
community burden.’”355 It held that Scottsdale’s fee meets the state standard, which 
requires that a municipality intends, in good faith, to use legislative development 
fees to provide additional public services, as required by the new development, 
within a reasonable time.356 
Courts in Georgia have also declined to apply Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to impact 
fees. Tree protection fees were challenged in the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision 
in Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass’n v. DeKalb County.357 The court concluded 
that the Tree Ordinance applied uniformly to all property in the county and regulated 
the building and development permits that disturb land and affect tree coverage.358 
In analyzing the “facial” challenge to the Tree Ordinance as a taking requiring 
compensation, the court refused to undertake an analysis under Dolan because 
Dolan involved an “as-applied” challenge whereas “this case involve[d] a facial 
challenge to a generally applicable land-use regulation.” 359  Additionally, the 
Georgia court noted that in Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,360 it 
had refused to apply Dolan to legislative determinations.361 The two dissenting 
justices in DeKalb, who also dissented in Parking Ass’n of Georgia,362 objected to 
the majority’s efforts to uphold the ordinance, claiming that the Tree Ordinance 
“results in a taking of property without compensation.” The DeKalb dissenters 
pointed out that Justice Thomas, joined by Justice O’Connor, dissented to the denial 
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of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of Georgia based on the lack of distinction between 
legislative and administrative acts.363 The DeKalb dissent also noted that there has 
not been a consensus in the courts on the issue of whether Dolan applies to 
legislative determinations, but that the two Supreme Court Justices in Parking Ass’n 
of Georgia “make a compelling case that Dolan applies beyond strictly adjudicatory 
decisions.”364 
Colorado does not apply the Nollan/Dolan takings analysis to legislatively 
enacted fees that are reasonably related to the impact caused by the development. 
For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District,365 the Colorado Supreme 
Court reviewed a takings challenge by developers to a plant investment fee 
(“PIF”).366 The fee was assessed on all building projects for purposes of providing 
wastewater services, as subject to state and federal regulations, in the face of impacts 
on water quality and quantity from human activity.367 An expert report was prepared 
and concluded that the PIF assessed against the Krupps’ project was “not excessive 
in relation to the projected impact” of the project and did, in fact, undercharge the 
Krupps for certain units. 368  Indeed, some scholars have observed that as 
municipalities are required to subject exactions to the Nollan/Dolan test, these 
municipalities have discovered that they have been exacting less than what the 
impact analysis would support.369 However, the PIF at issue in Krupp was not an 
exaction because “the District has no statutory or regulatory authority to deny or 
condition the issuance of building permits, and therefore, could not leverage or 
extort fees under threat of denying the permit.”370 The court held that the PIF was 
not subject to the Nollan/Dolan takings analysis and that it was a “valid, legislatively 
established fee that is reasonably related to the District’s interest in expanding its 
infrastructure to account for new development.”371 
In contrast to those states refusing to apply Nollan/Dolan to impact fees, the 
Ohio Supreme Court in Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City 
of Beavercreek,372 identified the test to be applied as “whether the fee is in proportion 
to the developer’s share of the city’s costs to construct and maintain roadways that 
                                                     
363 588 S.E.2d at 701 (quoting Parking Assn’n. of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 
1117–18 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that “[t]he 
distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings 
appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference”)). 
364 Id. 
365 19 P.3d 687 (Colo. 2001). 
366 Id. at 689. 
367 Id. at 690. 
368 Id. at 692. 
369 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 934, 967 (2003). 
370 19 P.3d at 692. 
371 Id. at 694 (finding that the “specific PIF assessment on the Krupps’ project was 
fairly calculated and rationally based”). 
372 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000). 
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will be used by the general public.”373 The court equated the Nollan/Dolan test to a 
dual rational nexus test and eschewed both the more lenient “reasonable 
relationship” test from California and the stricter “specific and uniquely attributable” 
test from Illinois.374 It concluded that the traffic development fees “were reasonable 
and that a reasonable relationship existed between the fee paid and the benefits 
accruing to developers,”375 which satisfied the test.376 Unfortunately, it appears that 
the court conflated the federal standard adopted for exactions in Nollan/Dolan and 
the original state standards used for exactions and labeled the test as the “dual 
rational nexus test” which was traditionally applied only to impact fees. Indeed, the 
Court in Dolan discussed the three general approaches used by states to evaluate 
exactions as: 1) the “very generalized statements as to the necessary connection 
between the required dedication and the proposed development” resulting in a lax 
standard of review; 2) the “‘specifi[c] and uniquely attributable’ test” from Illinois, 
which is too exacting; and 3) the reasonable relationship, or intermediate scrutiny 
test.377 These state tests for exactions are different from the dual rational nexus tests 
applied to impact fees in several states, as discussed above. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois also applied Dolan scrutiny to transportation 
impact fees in Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass’n v. County of DuPage.378 The 
court did not distinguish between exactions and impact fees and applied the standard 
from Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect,379 which was developed to 
evaluate the constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment and Illinois law of a 
requirement that a land developer dedicate 6.7 acres of land for an elementary school 
site and playground.380 Shortly thereafter, an Illinois appellate court in Amoco Oil 
Co. v. Village of Schaumburg,381 held that challenges against exactions under federal 
law would be governed by the less restrictive “rough proportionality” standard from 
Dolan, but noted that state court challenges would still be evaluated under the stricter 
Pioneer Trust standard.382 The Illinois appellate court also expressed its agreement 
with Justice Thomas’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of 
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,383 in which the Justice declared that there is no valid 
                                                     
373 Id. at 354. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 358; see also id. at 353 (noting that impact fees, whether labeled as a fee or a 
tax, were only unconstitutional if they were “unduly burdensome in application”). 
376 Id. at 355–56 (citing Associated Home Builders of Greater E. Bay, Inc. v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mt. Prospect, 
176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961)). 
377 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389–91 (adopting the reasonable relationship test for exactions from the majority of states and renaming it “rough proportionality” to avoid confusion with the laxer rational basis standard). 
378 649 N.E.2d 384, 388–89 (Ill. 1995). 
379 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961). 
380 649 N.E. 2d at 389–91 (citing 176 N.E.2d 799 at 800–02). 
381 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
382 Id. at 387 n.5. 
383 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional “distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized 
administrative takings.”384 The Illinois court then noted that even if there were such 
a distinction, it would nevertheless apply the Dolan test to both legislative and 
adjudicative actions.385  
While some states have judicially determined the level of scrutiny applied to 
impact fees, others have statutorily defined and limited the use of impact fees. 
Hawaii, for example, legislatively defines impact fees and limits the use of these 
fees to situations where the fees collected are used to fund the improvements 
required by the development.386 The public facilities to be benefitted by the fees are 
identified through a needs assessment study for either future or existing 
improvements.387 The developer is then required to pay a pro rata share of the cost, 
which must be proportional to improvements, and the impact fee must be “fair and 
reasonable.”388 To determine whether the impact fee assessed is proportional to the 
cost of improvements, the statute requires that seven factors be considered to ensure 
that the developer is not charged for more than his or her relative share of the 
community’s increased burden. 389  These detailed factors look to the additional 
demands placed on public facilities by the development, the availability of other 
funding for capital improvements, the extent to which the developer has previously 
paid impact fees without direct benefit, etc.390 In addition, the Hawaii code requires 
that impact fees collected be placed in a separate account; that impact fees be 
collected and expended in the same geographic zone that will benefit the new 
development; that the fees be related directly to the necessary improvements; that 
the fees be spent on the type of facilities for which they were collected; and that the 
fees be spent within six years of collection or else refunded to the developer with 
interest.391 
Washington has also adopted a statute to govern impact fees, and in City of 
Olympia v. Drebick,392 the Washington Supreme Court was called upon to determine 
the validity of a transportation impact fee.393 It applied the state statutory framework 
for impact fees, which is similar to the Hawaii legislation.394 In Washington, the 
                                                     
384 661 N.E.2d at 390 (citing 515 U.S. at 1118). 
385 Amoco Oil Co., 661 N.E.2d at 390. 
386 DAVID L. CALLIES, REGULATING PARADISE: LAND USE CONTROLS IN HAWAI’I 96 (2d ed. 2010). 
387 Id. at 96–97. 388 Id. at 97. 
389 Id. (referring to HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d) (2014)). 
390 HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d) (2014). 391 CALLIES, supra note 386, at 97 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-144). It should be noted that Professor Callies in early 2015 pointed out that to the best of his knowledge, “Hawai’i’s impact fee statute has never been used by any of our four counties.” E-mail from David L. Callies, Professor of Law, Univ. of Haw., to author (Jan. 5, 2015) (on file with author). 
392 126 P.3d 802 (Wash. 2006). 
393 Id. at 802. 
394 Id. at 804–06 (describing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.02.050–.090 of the Land Use 
Petition Act). 
2016] WHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT MISBEHAVES 157
impact fee statute authorizes local governments to impose fees on development 
activity in order to finance system improvements required to support new 
development.395 These impact fees  
 
(a) [s]hall only be imposed for system improvements that are reasonably 
related to the new development;  
(b) [s]hall not exceed a proportionate share of the costs of system 
improvements that are reasonably related to the new development; and  
(c) [s]hall be used for system improvements that will reasonably benefit 
the new development.396  
 
Like the Hawaii legislation, the local government has a six-year period in which 
to spend the impact fees “‘on public facilities intended to benefit the development 
activity for which the impact fees were paid.’”397 The Drebick court upheld the 
impact fee, distinguishing between impact fees and land dedications and refusing to 
apply the Nollan/Dolan test, as neither Nollan nor Dolan involved impact fees and 
instead concerned a requirement that the property owner dedicate a portion of their 
land for public use.398 
These state court examples illustrate the variety of approaches used to 
scrutinize monetary fees that are legislatively enacted.399 The level of judicial review 
over these impact fees ranges from the standard rational basis review applied to 
legislative actions; the Nollan/Dolan standard applied to exactions; the dual rational 
nexus test for impact fees, which requires the government to show that the impact 
fee does not exceed the costs attributable to the development and that the developer 
will receive a benefit from the infrastructure; and the more stringent “specific and 
uniquely attributable” standard from Pioneer Trust.400 This Article proposes that 
applying a judicial dual rational nexus test, or a similar state statute as found in 
Hawaii and Washington, will afford municipalities greater flexibility by deferring to 
legislative judgments about how to reasonably allocate development externalities, 
while deterring the abuse of power by using a sufficient level of judicial scrutiny to 
distinguish valid impact fees from invalid taxes.401 
                                                     
395 Id. at 804–05. 
396 Id. at 805 (emphasis in original) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.050(3)). 
397 Id. at 806 (emphasis in original) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.080(1)). 
398 Id. at 807–09. 
399 See also B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Utah 2006) 
(noting that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to both legislative and adjudicative impact fees 
and finding “that the legislature intended to apply the rough proportionality test to all 
exactions, irrespective of their source”). 
400 See generally Garnett, supra note 369, at 967 (discussing the evolution of the standards applied to regulatory takings). 
401  See Lawrence Friedman & Eric W. Wodlinger, Municipal Impact Fees in 
Massachusetts, 88 MASS. L. REV. 131, 137 (2004) (recommending that Massachusetts courts 
apply a dual rational nexus analysis to impact fees). 
158 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
D.  Impact Fees as Taxation 
 
Local government must deal with concerns about “the inadequacy of local 
public infrastructure” when faced with continued development in the community.402 
Impact fees and taxation are two different financial techniques available to address 
these concerns. However, local government “may regulate and impose fees on the 
basis of their police power, but they may not impose taxes.”403 If impact fees are 
considered taxes, it is because they must be paid by private parties to government 
agencies regardless of whether the private parties get the benefits of whatever 
activity is financed by the payments. 404  State legislatures generally limit local 
government’s power to tax, but voters who are upset with the taxation can use the 
election process to vote local officials out of office.405 However, if the taxes are 
applied only to land developers, citizens wishing to prevent growth could keep the 
local officials in office and place the burden of the public as a whole to maintain 
infrastructure, build schools, provide parks, etc., on the back of developers and 
newcomers. This is certainly a scenario intended to be addressed by the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause, at least according to the Court in Armstrong v. United 
States, 406  which observed that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”407 However, such 
a tax on land developers only would violate the basic rule that taxes must be 
uniform 408  and, in any event, taxes cannot be considered a Fifth Amendment 
taking409 “unless the taxation is so ‘arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it 
                                                     
402 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 22. 
403 Id. at 218. 
404 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 40; see also McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (describing the distinction between an impact fee and a tax). 
405 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 22. 
406 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
407 Id. at 49. 
408 See id. 
409 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600–01 (2013) 
(quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 243 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that “[i]t is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees . . . are not “takings”’”)); 
Laborde v. City of Gahanna, 561 F. App’x 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district 
court’s recognition of the “well-established proposition that a government’s act of taxation 
is not a ‘taking’ of private property under the Constitution”); Quarty v. United States, 170 
F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1916)); Coleman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is 
well established that Congress’s general exercise of its taxing power does not violate the 
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on takings without just compensation.”); Maxwell v. United 
States, 104 Fed. Cl. 112, 120 (Fed. Cl. 2012) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim 
“because the imposition of lawful taxes does not constitute a taking”); Montagne v. United 
States, 90 Fed. Cl. 41, 50 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (quoting Skillo v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 734, 
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was not the exertion of taxation, but a confiscation of property.’”410 In some states, 
cities do not have the authority to impose development impact fees as regulatory 
fees under their police power.411 If the impact fees operate as taxes, municipalities 
may violate state statutes that limit local government’s ability to impose taxes.412 
While taxes cannot be considered a taking, there are situations where the 
government essentially confiscates property, which can constitute a taking. 
Following the Koontz decision, the Seventh Circuit in Cerajeski v. Zoeller,413 found 
that Indiana’s retention of interest on Cerajeski’s bank account under an act for 
unclaimed property was a taking of property. 414  The court quoted Koontz as 
remarking: 
 
[W]e have repeatedly found takings where the government, by 
confiscating financial obligations, achieved a result that could have been 
obtained by imposing a tax. Most recently, in Brown [v. Legal Foundation 
of Washington[] we were unanimous in concluding that a State Supreme 
Court’s seizure of the interest on client funds held in escrow was a taking 
despite the unquestionable constitutional propriety of a tax that would 
have raised exactly the same revenue. Our holding in Brown followed 
from . . . two earlier cases in which we treated confiscations of money as 
takings despite their functional similarity to a tax.415 
 
According to Professor William Fischel, “economists have not provided 
especially helpful guidance about exactions and impact fees” and have treated these 
payments as though they were taxes.416 However, unlike taxes, a landowner can 
refuse to pay an exaction or impact fee and decline to receive a development 
permit.417 Fischel does not view this bargaining as antidevelopment, but instead sees 
exactions as giving landowners relief from the underlying regulations. 418  He 
recognizes that the Supreme Court exaction decisions have been embraced by 
                                                     
743 (Fed. Cl. 2005)) (noting that “the lawful exercise of the Government’s collection powers 
does not amount to a prohibited Fifth Amendment ‘taking’”). 
410 Quarty, 170 F.3d at 969 (quoting Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24); see also Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that Indiana’s retention of interest on Cerajeski’s bank account under an act for unclaimed property was a taking of property). 
411 See, e.g., Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass’n of 
Miss., Inc., 932 So. 2d 44, 53–59 (Miss. 2006) (holding that city’s impact fees constitute 
illegal taxes). 
412  See, e.g., Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., 970 N.E.2d 916, 923–24 (Ohio 2012) 
(applying a test that is similar to the dual rational nexus test to find that the impact fees were 
taxes in that they raised revenue for the public’s benefit and did not specially benefit those 
paying the fees). 
413 735 F.3d 577. 
414 Id. at 580. 
415 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601). 416 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 40. 
417 Id. at 41. 
418 Id. 
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developers who believe they face extortionate demands, but he is also concerned 
that these tests are “likely to inhibit ordinary negotiations.”419 
IV.  EXPANDING THE USE OF IMPACT FEES  
 
The traditional use of impact fees by municipalities to support the infrastructure 
needed for new development is changing as local government recognizes the impact 
that growth has on other concerns such as affordable housing, climate change, and 
environmental resilience and sustainability. Addressing issues such as wetlands 
mitigation, coastal changes, water resources, flood plains, and general land 
degradation has increasingly been considered a local responsibility. On the forefront 
of these issues, local municipalities have attempted to address the critical need for 
affordable housing by various financing approaches including mandatory set-asides, 
density bonuses, and linkage fees. Linkage fees “specify the benefits developers are 
required to provide according to a formula that is uniformly applied to all 
developers,” 420  thus avoiding the concern about ad hoc negotiating between 
municipalities and developers during the zoning approval process.421 
The constitutionality of these approaches to providing affordable housing has 
been challenged as a Fifth Amendment Taking without just compensation. 
Mandatory set-asides require commercial or residential developers to provide 
housing for lower-income groups or contribute funds for public construction of such 
housing. 422  Density bonuses from zoning officials are valuable when they 
accompany these set-asides in order to incentivize developers to provide affordable 
housing when the development creates the need for workforce housing.423 At issue 
is whether these inclusionary zoning techniques should be evaluated as exactions 
subject to a potential taking under the Nollan/Dolan standard; 424  land-use 
regulations subject to substantial deference under the police power; impact fees 
                                                     
419 Id. at 41–45 (concluding that “the Court’s exactions decisions run counter to the economic idea that takings jurisprudence makes governments face a higher cost for regulation”). 
420 Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Development Impact on Housing 
Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1991). 
421 Id. 
422 David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, URB. LAW., Fall 2010/Winter 2011, at 307, 308 (citing MANDELKER, supra note 82, at § 9.23). 
423 See id. at 323, 328–29. 
424  See Andrew W. Schwartz, The Impact of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management Dist. on Inclusionary Housing, 17th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings 
Challenges to Land Use and Environmental Regulations, U.C. Davis co-sponsored with 
Vermont Law, Sept. 2014 (on file with author) (noting the concern that “[b]ecause few 
inclusionary housing requirements are ad hoc, the prognosis for inclusionary housing under 
Koontz depends largely on whether courts expand the holding in Koontz to legislative 
exactions”). 
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subject to state judicial review standards such as the dual rational nexus test; or as 
invalid taxes.425 
Some states have treated mandatory set-asides as impact fees and have rejected 
the plea to apply heightened scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan. For example, in Holmdel 
Builders Ass’n v. Township of Holmdel,426 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
mandatory set-asides are similar to development fees in that they perform “an 
identical function.”427 Thus, as a form of inclusionary zoning to supply affordable 
housing, they are “regulatory measures, not taxes.”428 The California Supreme Court 
similarly refused to subject all development fees to heightened scrutiny under 
Nollan/Dolan in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco,429 by 
“adhering instead to the distinction we drew in Ehrlich . . . between ad hoc exactions 
and legislatively mandated, formulaic mitigation fees.”430 The court determined that 
the housing replacement fee, required when a landowner converted a residential 
hotel to use by tourists or daily renters, was not a tax designed to raise general 
revenue, but was instead paid into a special account used to replace the reduced 
residential housing as a result of the conversion.431 While refusing to apply the 
Nollan/Dolan test, the court in San Remo Hotel did apply increased scrutiny to the 
fee and noted that “[a]s a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, such fees 
must bear a reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the 
deleterious public impact of the development.”432 
California appellate courts have reached different conclusions when 
considering similar housing ordinances and have sometimes applied the reasonable 
relationship standard under the Mitigation Fee Act or the substantial deference 
standard applied to the exercise of police power.433 The California Supreme Court 
                                                     
425 See, e.g., Michael Floryan, Cracking the Foundation: Highlighting and Criticizing 
the Shortcomings of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1062–69 (2010) (noting that as among classifying mandatory set-asides as impact fees, taxes, rent control, or exactions for purposes of judicial scrutiny, “[t]he fourth, and most suitable, characterization of mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances is an ‘exaction,’” subject to 
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny); Tim Iglesias, Framing Inclusionary Zoning: Exploring the Legality 
of Local Inclusionary Zoning and Its Potential to Meet Affordable Housing Needs, ZONING 
& PLAN. L. REP., April 2013, at 1, 4, 13 n.22 (noting that inclusionary zoning may be challenged under different characterizations with “different possible legal tests”). 
426 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990). 
427 Id. at 294. 
428 Id. 
429 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002). 
430 Id. at 105. 431 Id. at 108. 
432 Id. at 105. 
433 See, e.g., Trinity Park, L.P. v. City of Sunnyvale, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 45 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011) (requiring that developer sell five of the forty-two planned houses below the 
market rate is not intended to “defra[y] all or a portion of the cost of public facilities related 
to the development project” and therefore “does not constitute an ‘other exaction’” within 
the meaning of the Mitigation Fee Act so that the statute of limitations for that Act is not 
applicable); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal. v. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63, 72–73 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to apply the Nollan/Dolan test to an affordable housing charge 
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in California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose,434 clarified the legal review 
standards for affordable housing ordinances by distinguishing housing ordinances 
that require developers to offset adverse impacts created by the proposed 
development, from housing ordinances that instead restrict a landowner’s use of land 
for broad general welfare purposes. 435  Housing ordinance provisions that are 
intended to address direct impacts will likely be considered exactions that must meet 
the means-end test under Nollan/Dolan or under the Mitigation Fee Act. Housing 
ordinances that limit developers in the use of their property for broader purposes 
under the police power will be subject to the traditional deferential standard of 
rational basis review.  
In City of San Jose, the court held that the city’s inclusionary housing 
conditions imposed on developments are not exactions subject to review under the 
unconstitutional conditions standards of the Takings Clause, but are instead 
limitations on the way developers can use their property.436 The city’s ordinance at 
issue required residential developments of twenty or more units to set aside fifteen 
percent of the units for below-market pricing for low-income households.437 The 
court distinguished its decision in San Remo Hotel stating that  
 
[U]nlike the condition that was at issue in San Remo Hotel . . . namely, an 
in lieu monetary fee that is imposed to mitigate a particular adverse effect 
of the development proposal under consideration—the conditions imposed 
by the San Jose ordinance at issue here do not require a developer to pay 
a monetary fee but rather place a limit on the way a developer may use its 
property.438  
 
The court determined that San Jose’s affordable housing ordinance was not an 
exaction, subject to scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan, but was instead a price control that 
                                                     
and applying instead the reasonable relationship requirement, used by the San Remo court, 
to find that the housing fee revision was not reasonably justified under the Development 
Agreement because it did not pass the mitigation fee test); Action Apartment Ass’n v. City 
of Santa Monica, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (refusing to apply 
Nollan/Dolan test to a legislative ordinance of general application that required affordable 
multifamily house as a condition to development approval); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. 
v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to apply 
Nollan/Dolan to the housing fee at issue because it was the result of generally applicable 
economic legislation and not ad hoc bargaining). 
434 Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 
2016 WL 763863 (2016). 
435 Id. (disapproving Building Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63, to the 
extent that it subjected an affordable housing in-lieu fee to a means-end test even though it 
was not imposed to mitigate the developer’s impact but was instead imposed to achieve a 
broader public purpose). 
436 City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974. 
437 Id. at 978. 
438 Id. at 979. 
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would not constitute a taking unless it was determined to be a regulatory taking 
under the multifactor test of Penn Central, which the challengers expressly declined 
to rely upon.439 
The court in City of San Jose also distinguished its opinion in Sterling Park, 
L.P. v. City of Palo Alto,440 finding that the San Jose ordinance could not be equated 
with the Palo Alto ordinance because the Palo Alto ordinance required the developer 
to grant an option to the city to buy the affordable units on the initial sale or resale 
of the units while the San Jose ordinance did not contain such a requirement.441 In 
Sterling Park, the court applied the statute of limitations from the Mitigation Fee 
Act to Palo Alto’s affordable housing requirements by treating them as exactions 
instead of land-use restrictions.442 The Mitigation Fee Act was enacted to respond to 
developer concerns that local governments were imposing development fees that 
were not related to the actual impact the proposed development might have on the 
local infrastructure. 443  Thus, the City of San Jose court determined that the 
affordable housing ordinance in San Jose was a land-use regulation limiting the 
developers’ use of property, while the Palo Alto ordinance was an exaction covered 
by the Mitigation Fee Act because it required developers to either pay an in-lieu 
exaction or sell units below market rate and grant the city options to purchase.444 
The court made clear that its decision in Sterling Park did not establish a “legal 
test that applies in evaluating the substantive validity of the affordable housing 
requirements imposed by an inclusionary housing ordinance.”445 Instead, the court 
explained that  
 
[W]hen a municipality enacts a broad inclusionary housing ordinance to 
increase the amount of affordable housing in the community and to 
disperse new affordable housing in economically diverse projects 
throughout the community, the validity of the ordinance does not depend 
upon a showing that the restrictions are reasonably related to the impact of 
a particular development to which the ordinance applies. Rather, the 
restrictions must be reasonably related to the broad general welfare 
purposes for which the ordinance was enacted.446 
 
                                                     
439 Id. at 991–92. 
440 310 P.3d 925 (Cal. 2013). 
441 City of San Jose, 351 P.3d at 1005–06. 
442 Sterling Park, 310 P.3d at 934 (“The statute governs conditions on development a 
local agency imposes that divest the developer of money or a possessory interest in property, 
but not restrictions on the manner in which a developer may use its property.”). 
443 See Barratt Am., Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 124 P.3d 719, 720 (Cal. 2005) 
(citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436 (Cal. 1996)). 
444 City of San Jose, 351 P.3d at 1005–06. 
445 Id. at 1006. 
446 Id. at 1000. 
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Drawing upon its decision in Ehrlich, the court distinguished between the 
recreational-development fee in that case that was intended to offset the impact of 
the proposed development and was therefore subject to the Nollan/Dolan test, and 
the public art fee, which constituted general legislation for the public benefit and 
was subject to the traditional deference standard.447 
Local government attempts to use impact fees and other revenue-raising 
techniques, specifically designed to mitigate development impacts on affordable 
housing needs, climate change, coastal resources, flood plains, water resources, and 
other environmental impacts,448 must be rationally tied to the projected impact of the 
project. It is likely that environmental impact assessments will continue to fill this 
role when a project potentially presents a significant impact.449 Exactions or impact 
fees imposed for the purpose of mitigating future impacts of development may 
require an immediate burden on a landowner to address harms such as shore 
protection projects anticipated from a future sea level rise.450 
Mandatory set-asides and linkage fees supporting inclusionary housing may be 
subject to scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan, particularly if the mechanism for 
determining such fees involves individualized bargaining between local officials and 
developers.451 But it is more likely that inclusionary housing ordinances will be 
legislative in nature and that Koontz should have no impact on such laws unless it is 
                                                     
447 Id. at 1001. 
448 See, e.g., Michael Castle Miller, Note, The New Per Se Takings Rule: Koontz’s 
Implicit Revolution of the Regulatory State, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 919, 945–46 (2014) (noting 
the concern that requiring coal-fired power plants to install scrubbers to mitigate air pollution 
as a condition to receive a building permit could be considered a per se taking after Koontz); 
see also Schwartz, supra note 424, at 16–17 (discussing concern “as to whether exactions 
that mitigate harm to the users of a new development project from a pre-existing 
environmental condition that the new development did not cause would satisfy the 
Nollan/Dolan test” and citing a case that will decide a similar issue, California Bldg. Indus. 
Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2013), review 
granted, California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 312 P.3d 1070 
(Cal. 2013)). 
449 Ruhl, supra note 22. 
450 See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 71, at 526–27. 
451 See, e.g., Lambert v. City & Cty. of S.F., 529 U.S. 1045, 1049 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (favoring remand for analysis of Planning Commission’s denial of a permit under Nollan/Dolan after commission sought a demand for a $600,000 payment and developer offered only $100,000); see Sanjay Bhatt & Daniel Beekman, Seattle Weighing New Tax on Builders for Affordable Housing, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2024555479_fees 17xml.html [http://perma.cc/A4DC-H22Y]; see also J. Michael Marshall & Mark A. Rothenberg, An Analysis of Affordable/Work-Force Housing Initiatives and Their Legality 
in the State of Florida, Part I, 82-JUN FLA. B.J. 79, 81 (2008) (arguing that “inclusionary zoning ordinances properly fall within the development exactions category and are subject to the Nollan/Dolan analysis”). See generally Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides, supra note 422, at 314–19.  
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decided that heightened scrutiny should apply to legislative regulations.452 Taxes 
may be imposed to spread the responsibility for addressing these impacts to all 
members of a community or region, but such taxation actions cannot be challenged 
as Fifth Amendment takings. 
If local municipalities or counties wish to mitigate development impacts on 
climate change and other natural resources, a neutral and generally applicable 
legislative scheme that is developed through expert studies will be the best approach 
to help prevent government from behaving badly in individualized situations. 
Depending upon the state, even these legislatively developed fees may require 
judicial scrutiny in the form of the dual rational nexus test, which may have the same 
practical effect as heightened judicial scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan. Nollan/Dolan 
scrutiny should be reserved for individualized government demands in a permitting 
situation when either land or money is exacted to specifically mitigate the proposed 
development’s impact. Legislatively determined impact fees should be subject to a 
means-ends test, sometimes referred to as the dual rational nexus test, to check for 
abuse and verify that fees are not being imposed as taxes. And legislation regulating 
the use of land under the police power should be subject to the traditional rational 
basis test for deference to the government if the validity of the action is “fairly 
debatable.”  
 
V.  CONCLUSION  
 
The majority’s decision in Koontz, to submit monetary in-lieu exactions to the 
Nollan/Dolan test, fits into the overall regulatory takings structure established by the 
Supreme Court since the Pennsylvania Coal decision in 1922. Koontz echoes the 
objective developed in Nollan and Dolan to “provide important protection against 
the misuse of the power of land-use regulation.”453 This has been a consistent theme 
as noted by the Court in Lingle when it repudiated the “substantially advances” 
means-ends takings test from Agins.454 The Court retained the Nollan/Dolan test, 
even though it was developed from the “substantially advances” prong of Agins, 
explaining “that the application of intermediate judicial review in Nollan/Dolan was 
appropriate because, as a condition of ad hoc development approval, a local agency 
exacted an ad hoc possessory interest in property, tantamount to a physical 
taking.”455 The Lingle Court recognized that it is well established that legislative 
judgments about the need for regulatory actions and the likely effectiveness of such 
actions are entitled to deference.456 Lower court cases decided since Koontz have 
generally cited to it for purposes of saying that taxes are not takings and that the 
                                                     
452 See Schwartz, supra note 424, at 22–24 (proposing that “intermediate scrutiny does 
not apply to legislative inclusionary housing” by analyzing California cases that have 
generally upheld inclusionary housing ordinances against takings challenges). 
453 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013). 
454 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). 
455 Schwartz, supra note 424, at 15 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545–48). 
456 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545. 
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obligation to pay money, unless tied to a specific property interest, is not a per se 
taking. 457  Koontz has also been cited in reference to the application of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,458 but has created confusion in cases applying 
the Nollan/Dolan framework to evaluate a takings challenge to legislation requiring 
the set-aside of raisins459 and legislation requiring property owners to pay a lump 
sum amount to displaced tenants to address affordable housing needs.460 
Legislatively determined impact or assessment fees, established outside the 
land-use permitting context, should not be subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny and 
should instead be tested under the applicable state law review standard, such as 
deferential review, statutory review, or the dual rational nexus test. The dual rational 
nexus test focuses on whether 1) there is a rational nexus “‘between the need for 
additional capital facilities and the growth in population generated by the 
subdivision’” and 2) there is a rational nexus “‘between the expenditures of the funds 
collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision.’”461 While this test may seem 
similar to the Nollan/Dolan test, which requires that there be an essential nexus and 
proportionality between the exaction requested and the impact caused by the 
development sought, the dual rational nexus test requires that the impact fee does 
not exceed the cost of the infrastructure required by the development and that the 
development receives a benefit from the infrastructure. If the state has not defined a 
heightened review standard for legislative impact fees, the fees should be treated as 
any other legislative act and given great deference.462 However, even if the impact 
fee passes the state test, landowners can still assert a takings challenge. 
Any physical occupation or confiscation of real property, whether based upon 
administrative or legislative action should be a per se taking under Loretto unless it 
is part of a land-use permitting process. Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny was 
developed to address government demands that would otherwise be a per se taking 
if made outside the context of land-use permitting. However, because the 
government could deny the permit outright, it is allowed instead to condition the 
permit on exactions that mitigate the project’s impact so long as the conditions are 
not unconstitutional. Therefore, the Nollan/Dolan test should be applied only to 
                                                     
457 See, e.g., Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util., 7 N.E.3d 1045, 1055 (Mass. 2014) (noting that “[o]n the whole, Federal courts have established that an obligation to pay money is not a per se taking where the obligation does not affect or operate on a specific, identified property interest”). 
458 See, e.g., Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337, 393 (Wisc. 2014) (quoting Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594) (noting that “[t]he doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides that ‘the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right’”)). 
459 See discussion of Horne, supra Section II.A. 
460 See discussion of Levin, supra Section II.A. 
461 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 226 (quoting Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 431 
So. 2d 606, 611–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1983) (noting that the second prong of the test will 
not be satisfied unless “the ordinance . . . specifically earmark[s] the funds collected for use 
in acquiring capital facilities to benefit the new residents”)). 
462 See Schwartz, supra note 424, at 25 (suggesting that municipalities conduct a nexus 
study to support an inclusionary housing ordinance against potential challenges). 
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government actions conditioning the grant of land-use permits on individualized 
exactions, either physical or monetary. 
The physical occupation or confiscation of personal property through 
administrative or legislative action is also considered a per se taking based on a long 
line of precedential decisions that precede the Loretto decision. Legislative 
regulations of either personal property or real property should not be evaluated under 
Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny because regulations are not part of the 
individualized land-use permitting process. 
Takings challenges may be successful against either legislative or 
administrative government actions, if such regulation “goes too far.” However, 
unless the context of the challenge is a land-permitting process, such takings 
challenges should be analyzed using the Court’s regulatory takings framework, 
without the Nollan/Dolan scrutiny needed to address the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. If the government action causes a permanent physical occupation or 
confiscation of property, it is a per se taking under Loretto. If the government action 
deprives the property owner of all economically viable use, it is a per se taking under 
Lucas, unless excepted under state law concepts of property. Finally, if it is not a per 
se taking, but instead deprives the property owner of partial economic value, it 
should be analyzed under the Penn Central factors by looking at the severity of the 
impact on the property value, the interference with the property owner’s investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the government action. 
The land-use law framework, developed at both the state and federal levels, is 
designed to apply heightened scrutiny to government actions in situations where 
there is a potential for the abuse of power. When government officials make 
decisions that are tied to a specific landowner in an administrative, rather than 
legislative capacity, there is the concern that the landowner is being either unjustly 
favored or disfavored. Thus, challenges to these individualized actions will be 
subject to greater scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s approach to takings law 
appropriately recognizes this potential for abuse in applying the Nollan/Dolan test 
to both physical and monetary exactions in the context of land-use permitting. 
However, this Article proposes that Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is not appropriate for 
generalized legislative actions that impose financial burdens on property owners and 
that “in lieu” exactions individually assessed as part of the permitting process should 
be distinguished from impact fees applied equally to all developers without regard 
to a specific project. 
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